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On May 17, 1954, the United States Supreme Court issued its 
landmark decision in Brown v. Board of Education. Declaring 
“that in the field of public education the doctrine of ‘separate but 
equal’ has no place,” the Court determined that “we cannot turn 
the clock back to 1868 when the Fourteenth Amendment was 
adopted, or even to 1896 when Plessy v. Ferguson was written.” 
Over the years, several originalist scholars have noted that an 
interpretive theory that produces the conclusion that Brown was 
wrongly decided will have little appeal, and have undertaken the 
task of demonstrating that Brown can be squared with and justified 
by originalism.  
This essay examines and critiques these efforts and focuses, in 
particular, on one posited attribute and aspect of originalism: the 
constraint on judges and interpreters. This essay argues that 
certain originalist methodologies employed in the effort to justify 
Brown are in fact discretionary in several key respects, and that 
those answering in the affirmative “is Brown originalist?” have 
employed “discretionary originalism” in ways that are antithetical 
to originalism’s posited discretion-constraining promise.  
                                                            
*Alumnae Law Center Professor of Law, University of Houston Law Center. 
J.D., University of Pennsylvania Law School; B.A., Wilberforce University. The 
author acknowledges and is thankful for the research support provided by the 
Alumnae Law Center donors and the University of Houston Law Foundation. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
On May 17, 1954 the United States Supreme Court issued its 
landmark and canonical decision in Brown v. Board of Education.1 
The Court, interpreting and applying the Equal Protection Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution,2 
and “consider[ing] public education in the light of its full 
development and its present place in American life throughout the 
nation,”3 declared “that in the field of public education the doctrine 
of ‘separate but equal’ has no place.”4 In so ruling, the Court 
determined that “we cannot turn the clock back to 1868 when the 
[Fourteenth] Amendment was adopted, or even to 1896 when 
Plessy v. Ferguson was written.”5  
The Brown Court did not employ originalism, the label given 
to a family of theories that consider “the discoverable meaning of 
the Constitution at the time of its initial adoption as authoritative 
for purposes of constitutional interpretation in the present.”6 As 
                                                            
1 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
2 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No State shall . . . deny to any 
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”). 
3 Brown, 347 U.S. at 492–93. 
4 Id. at 495. 
5 Id. at 492. For the Supreme Court’s full 1896 opinion, see Plessy v. 
Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
6 Keith E. Whittington, The New Originalism, 2 GEO. J. L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 599, 599 (2004) [hereinafter Whittington, The New Originalism]. For 
discussions and analyses of originalism, see JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING 
ORIGINALISM (2011); RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST 
CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY (rev. ed. 2014); ROBERT W. 
BENNETT & LAWRENCE B. SOLUM, CONSTITUTIONAL ORIGINALISM: A 
DEBATE (2011); FRANK B. CROSS, THE FAILED PROMISE OF ORIGINALISM 
(2013); DENNIS J. GOLDFORD, THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION AND THE 
DEBATE OVER ORIGINALISM (2005); INTERPRETING THE CONSTITUTION: THE 
DEBATE OVER ORIGINAL INTENT (Jack N. Rakove ed., 1990); LEONARD W. 
LEVY, ORIGINAL INTENT AND THE FRAMERS’ CONSTITUTION (Ivan R. Dee 
2000) (1988); JOSEPH M. LYNCH, NEGOTIATING THE CONSTITUTION: THE 
EARLIEST DEBATES OVER ORIGINAL INTENT (1999); JOHNATHAN O’NEILL, 
ORIGINALISM IN AMERICAN LAW AND POLITICS: A CONSTITUTIONAL 
HISTORY (2005); ORIGINALISM: A QUARTER-CENTURY OF DEBATE (Steven 
G. Calabresi ed., 2007); JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS 
AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION (1st Vintage Books ed. 
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Keith Whittington noted, originalism is both old and new.7 Old 
Originalism emphasized the Framers’ intent at the time of drafting 
and was concerned with “prevent[ing] judges from acting as 
legislators and substituting their own substantive political 
preferences and values for those of the people and their elected 
representatives.”8 New Originalism focuses on the original public 
meaning of constitutional text:9 “the meaning that the words and 
phrases had (or would have had) to ordinary members of the 
public.”10 New Originalism, like Old Originalism, focuses on 
“judicial constraint—in the sense of promising to narrow the 
discretion of judges.”11  
                                                            
1997); THE CHALLENGE OF ORIGINALISM: THEORIES OF CONSTITUTIONAL 
INTERPRETATION (Grant Huscroft & Bradley W. Miller eds., 2011); KEITH E. 
WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION: DIVIDED POWERS AND 
CONSTITUTIONAL MEANING (1st reprt. 2001); KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, 
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: TEXTUAL MEANING, ORIGINAL INTENT, 
AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (1999). 
7 Whittington, The New Originalism, supra note 6, at 599. 
8 Id. at 602. 
9 See id. at 609–10. 
10 Lawrence B. Solum, We Are All Originalists Now, in 
CONSTITUTIONAL ORIGINALISM: A DEBATE, supra note 6, at 2–3. Solum notes 
“four core ideas” defining New Originalism. (1) The “fixation thesis”: “the 
meaning of each provision of the Constitution becomes fixed when that 
provision is framed and ratified,” with meaning referring to “meaning in the 
linguistic sense.” Id. at 2. (2) Original public meaning: “the meaning that the 
words and phrases had (or would have had) to ordinary members of the public.” 
Id. at 2–3. (3) The original public meaning has “the force of law”: “courts and 
officials are bound by the text of the Constitution” and the “linguistic meaning 
of the text . . . is the supreme law of the land.” Id. at 3. (4) The distinction 
between constitutional interpretation and constitutional construction. 
Understanding and applying legal text involves a two-step process. The first 
step, constitutional interpretation, discerns the linguistic meaning of the text. 
The second step, constitutional construction, “enables officials to apply the text” 
as courts “fashion doctrines or rules of constitutional law” and Congress and the 
President act “in ways that require implementation of the Constitution.” Id. at 3–
4. 
11 Thomas B. Colby, The Sacrifice of the New Originalism, 99 GEO. 
L.J. 713, 751 (2011); see also DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, 
DESPERATELY SEEKING CERTAINTY: THE MISGUIDED QUEST FOR 
CONSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS 13 (2002) (scholars “alarmed at any hint of 
judicial discretion . . . in constitutional cases . . . seek a grand theory that will 
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With the judicial constraint justification for originalism 
foregrounded, can a persuasive argument be made that Brown is 
consistent with originalism? Originalists have observed that much 
rides on the answer to this question given the “widespread belief 
that [Brown] was inconsistent with the original understanding of 
the Fourteenth Amendment.”12 Michael McConnell, a prominent 
originalist, has observed that the “supposed inconsistency between 
Brown and the original meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment has 
assumed enormous importance in modern debate over 
constitutional theory. Such is the moral authority of Brown that if 
any particular theory does not produce the conclusion that Brown 
was correctly decided, the theory is seriously discredited.”13 
Another originalist, Robert Bork, remarked that “any theory that 
seeks acceptance must, as a matter of psychological fact, if not of 
logical necessity, account for the result in Brown.”14 As Pamela 
Karlan has noted, “Precisely because Brown has become the crown 
jewel of the United States Reports, every constitutional theory 
must claim Brown for itself. A constitutional theory that cannot 
produce the result reached in Brown . . . is a constitutional theory 
without traction.”15  
                                                            
constrain judges and provide definitive answers to difficult interpretive 
questions”). 
12 CROSS, supra note 6, at 92. 
13 Michael W. McConnell, Originalism and the Desegregation 
Decisions, 81 VA. L. REV. 947, 952 (1995). 
14 ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL 
SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 77 (1990). 
15 Pamela S. Karlan, What Can Brown Do For You?: Neutral 
Principles and the Struggle Over the Equal Protection Clause, 58 DUKE L.J. 
1049, 1060 (2009); see also KERMIT ROOSEVELT III, THE MYTH OF JUDICIAL 
ACTIVISM: MAKING SENSE OF SUPREME COURT DECISIONS 68 (2006) (while 
“[s]ome originalists still take the position that Brown exemplifies illegitimate 
judicial decision-making in the name of a desirable result . . . most originalists 
are more concerned to explain how Brown is actually correct on originalist 
grounds, thinking (rightly) that an approach to constitutional interpretation under 
which Brown was wrongly decided will have little appeal for the American 
public”); ADRIAN VERMEULE, JUDGING UNDER UNCERTAINTY: AN 
INSTITUTIONAL THEORY OF LEGAL INTERPRETATON 280 (2006) (“Some have 
claimed that any respectable account of constitutional adjudication must be able 
to justify Brown.”); J. HARVIE WILKINSON III, COSMIC CONSTITUTIONAL 
THEORY: WHY AMERICANS ARE LOSING THEIR INALIENABLE RIGHT TO SELF-
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This Article considers several efforts to square Brown with 
purportedly discretion-narrowing originalist theories. As discussed 
herein, various originalist accounts and theories that have been 
presented in support of the Brown-is-originalist position are 
grounded in interpreter discretion and interpretive choices. While 
this observation does not lead to the conclusion that all posited 
attributes of originalism are problematic, I argue that originalism 
does not meaningfully constrain interpreters who are and remain 
free to fashion and shape the methodology in ways that yield a 
Brown-is-originalist conclusion. Agreeing with legal scholar 
Andrew Koppelman, that the notion of a constitutional theory “that 
is self-sufficient and not vulnerable to penetration by discretion 
and contingency is a . . . self-protective delusion,”16 this Article 
concludes that the originalist methodologies discussed herein are in 
fact discretionary in at least four respects.  
First, originalism “is itself a choice.”17 Constitutional 
interpreters and theorists may choose from a menu of interpretive 
choices, including originalism, living constitutionalism, history, 
text, purpose, precedent, doctrine, prudence, structure, political 
process concerns, ethical concerns, social values, consequences of 
decisions, and moral readings of the Constitution.18 Those who 
                                                            
GOVERNANCE 17 (2012) (“Brown affords living constitutionalists a 
nonoriginalist case whose ultimate salutary effect on American equality properly 
renders the result nearly immune from criticism.”); Michael C. Dorf, Equal 
Protection Incorporation, 88 VA. L. REV. 951, 958 (2002) (“[C]onservatives 
who are generally sympathetic to originalism cannot openly say that Brown v. 
Board of Education was wrongly decided” and so they “concoct implausible 
accounts of the Reconstruction Era understanding of segregation”).  
16 Andrew Koppelman, Why Jack Balkin is Disgusting, 27 CONST. 
COMMENT. 177, 185 (2010). 
17 Eric Posner, Originalism Means Not Always Getting What You 
Want (Feb. 10, 2014), http://ericposner.com/originalism-means-not-always-
getting-what-you-want/. 
18 See generally PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL 
INTERPRETATION (1991); PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY 
OF THE CONSTITUTION (1982); STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: 
INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION (2005); RONALD DWORKIN, 
FREEDOM’S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 
(1996); JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF 
JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980); DAVID A. STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION 
(2010). 
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believe that originalism is the only legitimate method of 
constitutional interpretation19 choose that theory over, and to the 
exclusion of, other methodologies. That choice may or may not be 
the correct one, but it is a choice nonetheless.  
Second, an originalist has and enjoys unfettered discretion in 
choosing among several “diverse and, to some extent, conflicting” 
originalist theories,20 including original intent, original 
understanding, original expected application, original public 
meaning, original methods, and framework originalism. These 
“originalisms” have been developed over time as originalism has 
been “working itself pure.”21  
Third, an originalist is free to frame the inquiry and choose 
what she considers to be “the proper level of generality at which a 
right should be characterized.”22 Characterizing a claimed right 
broadly (for example, the right to a public education) or more 
precisely and narrowly (for example, the right to attend racially 
desegregated schools) is a critical descriptive as well as normative 
matter and choice, and one that can be influenced by an 
interpreter’s value choices and objectives.23  
Fourth, an originalist interpreter enjoys discretion in framing 
the parameters of the evidentiary inquiry relative to a particular 
constitutional issue under consideration. What are the facts and 
circumstances relevant to the “is Brown originalist” inquiry? Those 
found in Congressional and ratification debates about the 
Fourteenth Amendment? In the original public meaning of the 
Fourteenth Amendment and its various provisions? In the “real-
world forms of institutionalized humiliation”24 and the ways in 
                                                            
19 See Vasan Kesavan & Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Interpretive 
Force of the Constitution’s Secret Drafting History, 91 GEO. L.J. 1113, 1129 
(2003).  
20 See Ryan C. Williams, Originalism and the Other Desegregation 
Decision, 99 VA. L. REV. 493, 573 (2013). 
21 Kesavan & Paulsen, supra note 19, at 1114. 
22 Patrick S. Shin, Discrimination Under a Description, 47 GA. L. 
REV. 1, 33–34 (2012). 
23 See LAURENCE H. TRIBE & MICHAEL C. DORF, ON READING THE 
CONSTITUTION 73 (1991). 
24 3 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: THE CIVIL RIGHTS 
REVOLUTION 300 (2014). 
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which the “practice of segregated schooling was just a special case 
of a more general evil—the systematic perpetuation of ‘feelings of 
inferiority’”?25 In the history and lived experiences of those 
subjected to and subordinated by white supremacy before, at the 
time of, and after the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, an 
amendment which “was a failure in its time”?26  
An “utterly unconstraining” and “malleable” originalism that 
“can be used for any desired end . . . is functionally dejustified as 
an interpretive standard.”27 Given the aforementioned aspects of 
what I call discretionary originalism, are originalists addressing 
the Brown and originalism issue subject to and governed by the 
discretion-narrowing promise of originalism? This is an important 
question, for if originalism does not constrain judges and other 
interpreters “that fact totally undercuts the case for the method.”28 
Thus, the question whether originalism (or any other interpretive 
methodology) is meaningfully constraining is a critical one for all 
engaged in constitutional interpretation and application.29  
This Article’s discussion of these and other queries unfolds as 
follows. Part I provides a brief overview of “race,”30 rights, and the 
                                                            
25 Id. at 13. 
26 Jamal Greene, Fourteenth Amendment Originalism, 71 MD. L. 
REV. 978, 980 (2012). 
27 CROSS, supra note 6, at 180–81. 
28 Id. at 20. 
29 For a skeptical view of the interpreter-constraining capacity of any 
interpretive theory, see John Harrison, On the Hypotheses That Lie at the 
Foundations of Originalism, 31 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 473 (2008). 
30 The placement of quotation marks around the word “race” is done 
for the purpose of emphasizing that “race is a social construction” and “a 
biologically arbitrary grouping of individuals” with “no fundamental moorings 
in biology or genetics.” Khiara M. Bridges, The Dangerous Law of Biological 
Race, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 21, 28–30 (2013). An opposing view and theory 
posits “that race has a biological essence” and that “individuals belonging to a 
race are united by shared genes and are genetically more similar to one another 
than to those of different races.” Id. Biological race is a false belief that has been 
debunked and disconfirmed by the Human Genome Project’s revelation that, in 
genetic terms, all individuals are 99.9 percent the same. See DOROTHY 
ROBERTS, FATAL INVENTION: HOW SCIENCE, POLITICS, AND BIG BUSINESS 
RE-CREATE RACE IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 50 (2011); see also 
Bridges, supra, at 32 (“The [Human Genome] Project revealed that all persons, 
without regard to racial ascription or identification, share 99.9 percent of the 
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Fourteenth Amendment, and includes a discussion of the three 
separate and distinct categories of rights recognized in the 
Reconstruction era: civil rights, political rights, and social rights. 
As demonstrated in that part, at the time of the adoption of the 
Fourteenth Amendment social rights (including the right to attend 
a desegregated school and to marry a person of another race) were 
deemed to be outside the protective scope of the amendment, a fact 
which calls into question the notion and conclusion that Brown is 
consistent with originalism. 
Part II turns to Brown. Because Chief Justice Warren’s opinion 
is typically not studied with care or precision, the Court’s decision 
and reasoning, as well as certain matters leading up to the ruling 
(including originalist arguments made to the Court), are examined 
here in detail. Part III also comments on the Declaration of 
Constitutional Principles, also known as the “Southern Manifesto,” 
and that declaration’s originalist critique of the Brown decision. As 
discussed therein, in the Manifesto the vast majority of United 
States Senators and Representatives from southern states protested 
that Brown violated the original intent and understanding of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.  
In Part III the essay examines originalist answers to the 
question of whether Brown can be squared with or justified by 
originalism(s). Some originalists (for example, Raoul Berger and 
Earl Maltz) have concluded that Brown is contrary to the original 
intent of the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment and was 
therefore wrongly decided. Other originalists (Robert Bork, Justice 
Antonin Scalia, Michael McConnell, Jack Balkin, Steven Calabresi 
and Michael Perl, and John McGinnis and Michael Rappaport) 
have answered the “is Brown originalist” query in the affirmative. 
In doing so, they have employed discretionary originalism in ways 
that are antithetical to the posited discretion-constraining promise 
of originalism.  
 
 
                                                            
same genes, and it concluded—definitively—that humans could not be divided 
into coherent biological races.”). “[T]here are no biological races in the human 
species. Period.” ROBERTS, supra, at 77.  
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I. RACE, RIGHTS, AND THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 
 
While the United States Constitution of 1789 did not explicitly 
use the term “slavery,” a number of constitutional provisions 
directly or indirectly referred to that subject.31 The “peculiar 
institution” of this nation’s chattel slavery was justified, in part, by 
a white-supremacist theory of congenital inferiority, which posited 
that enslaved persons of African descent were genetically and 
intellectually inferior to whites32 (a view held by The Star 
Spangled Banner author Francis Scott Key).33 
The Supreme Court announced its agreement with the black-
inferiority thesis in Dred Scott v. Sandford.34 The Court’s decision, 
“the original sin of originalism,”35 held that African slaves and 
                                                            
31 The Constitution prohibited Congressional interference with the 
slave trade before 1808. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 1. Enslaved persons who 
escaped to a free state were to be “delivered up” and returned to the slave state 
from which they fled. Id., art. IV, § 2, cl. 3; Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. 539, 
540 (1842). Enslaved persons were to be counted as “three fifths of all other 
Persons” for purposes of determining representation in the United States House 
of Representatives and votes in the Electoral College, and for levying taxes 
among the states. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2. This “federal ratio” enshrined in the 
three-fifths clause “richly rewarded the southern states, artificially inflating their 
House seats and electoral votes and helping to explain why four of the first five 
presidents hailed from Virginia.” RON CHERNOW, ALEXANDER HAMILTON 239 
(2004).  
32 See JOHN HOPE FRANKLIN, RACE AND HISTORY: SELECTED 
ESSAYS 1938–1988, at 325 (1992); KENNETH M. STAMPP, THE PECULIAR 
INSTITUTION: SLAVERY IN THE ANTE-BELLUM SOUTH 197–236 (1956). 
33  See JEFFERSON MORLEY, SNOW-STORM IN AUGUST: 
WASHINGTON CITY, FRANCIS SCOTT KEY, AND THE FORGOTTEN RACE RIOT 
OF 1835, at 40 (2012) (“Key shared a general view of the free people of color as 
shiftless and untrustworthy: a nuisance, if not a menace, to white people. He 
spoke publicly of Africans in America as ‘a distinct and inferior race of people, 
which all experience proves to be the greatest evil that affects a community.’”). 
34 60 U.S. 393 (1857). For more on Dred Scott, see MARK A. 
GRABER, DRED SCOTT AND THE PROBLEM OF CONSTITUTIONAL EVIL (2008). 
35 B. Jessie Hill, Resistance to Constitutional Theory: The Supreme 
Court, Constitutional Change, and the “Pragmatic Moment,” 91 TEX. L. REV. 
1815, 1833 (2013); see also Mitchell N. Berman, Originalism Is Bunk, 84 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 23 n.51 (2009) (“Given the universal opprobrium that 
attaches to Dred Scott, it is unsurprising that Originalists would seek to disavow 
it.”). 
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their descendants were not and could not be citizens of the United 
States. The Court described enslaved persons and their progeny as 
“beings of an inferior order, and altogether unfit to associate with 
the white race, either in social or political relations; and so far 
inferior, that they had no rights which the white man was bound to 
respect.”36 The Court stated that “that race” “[was] not even in the 
minds of the Framers of the Constitution when they were 
conferring special rights and privileges upon the citizens of a State 
in every other part of the Union.”37 Indeed,” the Court opined, 
“when we look to the condition of this race in the several States at 
the time, it is impossible to believe that these rights and privileges 
were intended to be extended to them.”38 
The supposition of inferior and rightless persons of African 
descent, which the Court endorsed a mere eleven years before the 
adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, was an undeniable aspect 
of social, political, legal, and economic life in pre- and post-Civil 
War America. Any discussion of race, rights, and the Fourteenth 
Amendment must account for the racial realities of this world and 
the racist worldviews of those who created, maintained, and 
benefited from them. 
 
A. The Black Codes, The Civil Rights Act of 1866, and 
the Fourteenth Amendment 
 
The Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution formally 
banned slavery in 1865.39 In the former Confederate states, 
Emancipation met a backlash in the forms of white vigilantism and 
lynchings.40 The paramilitary Ku Klux Klan commenced a 
                                                            
36 Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 407. 
37 Id. at 412. 
38 Id. 
39 See U.S CONST. amend. XIII (“Neither slavery nor involuntary 
servitude, except as punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been 
duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their 
jurisdiction.”). 
40 See PHILIP DRAY, AT THE HANDS OF PERSONS UNKNOWN: THE 
LYNCHING OF BLACK AMERICA (2002). 
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campaign of harassment, intimidation, and even murder, directed 
at freedpersons and others.41 
“New slavery,” pursued via Black Codes,42 returned 
freedpersons to “a condition as close to their former one as it was 
possible to get without actually reinstituting slavery.”43 In the 
words of William A. Sinclair, who was born into slavery, 
southerners were determined to use the Black Codes “to suppress 
the colored man” and “make his condition worse under 
emancipation than it was under slavery, depriving him of every 
protection, making him an outcast.”44 Expressing a different view, 
Columbia University history professor William Archibald 
Dunning’s 1907 book on Reconstruction argued that the Black 
Codes were 
in the main a conscientious straightforward attempt 
to bring some sort of order out of the social and 
economic chaos which a full acceptance of the 
results of war and emancipation involved. The 
freedmen were not, and in the nature of the case 
could not for generations be, on the same social, 
moral, and intellectual plane with the whites; and 
                                                            
41 See STEVEN HAHN, A NATION UNDER OUR FEET: BLACK 
POLITICAL STRUGGLES IN THE RURAL SOUTH FROM SLAVERY TO THE GREAT 
MIGRATION 267, 276–80 (2003). 
42 “Black Codes were formally and facially asymmetric: They heaped 
disabilities on blacks but not on whites.” AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S 
UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION: THE PRECEDENTS AND PRINCIPLES WE LIVE BY 
149 (2012). For more on Black Codes, see DAVID E. BERNSTEIN, ONLY ONE 
PLACE OF REDRESS: AFRICAN AMERICANS, LABOR REGULATIONS, AND THE 
COURTS FROM RECONSTRUCTION TO THE NEW DEAL 8 (2001); PAUL D. 
MORENO, BLACK AMERICANS AND ORGANIZED LABOR: A NEW HISTORY 19 
(2006). Post-slavery Black Codes were not the first such codes in the nation’s 
history. A number of post-Revolutionary northern states passed “‘Black Codes’ 
that denied blacks fundamental rights and limited their opportunities to work 
and to move in search of work.” JACQUELINE JONES, A DREADFUL DECEIT: 
THE MYTH OF RACE FROM THE COLONIAL ERA TO OBAMA’S AMERICA 101 
(2013).  
43 NICHOLAS LEMANN, REDEMPTION: THE LAST BATTLE OF THE 
CIVIL WAR 34 (2006). 
44 WILLIAM A. SINCLAIR, THE AFTERMATH OF SLAVERY: A STUDY 
OF THE CONDITION AND ENVIRONMENT OF THE AMERICAN NEGRO 3 (1905). 
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this fact was recognized by constituting them a 
separate class of the civil order.45 
African-American workers who lacked a labor contract or were 
unemployed were criminally prosecuted for vagrancy46 and, once 
convicted, “were fined heavily and could be hired out by the state 
for a pittance until the fine was paid.”47 Alabama leased 374 black 
prisoners to the Alabama & Chattanooga Railroad; Texas received 
$12.50 per month for providing two railroad companies with 250 
“convicts.”48 
Responding to the Black Codes, Congress, over the veto of 
white supremacist and “fervent Negrophobe” President Andrew 
Johnson,49 enacted the Civil Rights of 1866. That legislation 
provided, in pertinent part: 
[A]ll persons born in the United States . . . are 
hereby declared to be citizens of the United States 
and such citizens . . . shall have the same right . . . 
to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, 
and give evidence, to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, 
hold and convey real and personal property, and to 
the full and equal benefit of all laws and 
                                                            
45 WILLIAM ARCHIBALD DUNNING, RECONSTRUCTION, POLITICAL 
AND ECONOMIC, 1865-1877, at 58 (1907). As noted by one scholar, the 
“Dunning school of Reconstruction historiography” assumed “‘negro 
incapacity’” and “portrayed African Americans either as ‘children,’ ignorant 
dupes manipulated by unscrupulous whites, or as savages, their primal passions 
unleashed by the end of slavery.” ERIC FONER, FOREVER FREE: THE STORY OF 
EMANCIPATION AND RECONSTRUCTION xxii (2005).  
46 See BRUCE BARTLETT, WRONG ON RACE: THE DEMOCRATIC 
PARTY’S BURIED PAST 33 (2008). 
47 Id.; see also BERNSTEIN, supra note 42, at 10 (vagrancy laws in 
North Carolina, Georgia, Virginia and Texas “essentially criminalized 
unemployment, even temporary unemployment”). 
48 DOUGLAS A. BLACKMON, SLAVERY BY ANOTHER NAME: THE 
RE-ENSLAVEMENT OF BLACK AMERICANS FROM THE CIVIL WAR TO WORLD 
WAR II 54 (2008). 
49 RANDALL KENNEDY, THE PERSISTENCE OF THE COLOR LINE: 
RACIAL POLITICS AND THE OBAMA PRESIDENCY 42 (2011); see also Annette 
Gordon-Reed, Andrew Johnson, in THE AMERICAN PRESIDENTS 112, 124 
(Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. & Sean Wilentz eds., 2011) (discussing Johnson’s 
white supremacist views). 
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proceedings for the security of person and property, 
as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject 
to like punishment, pains, and penalties, and to none 
other, any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or 
custom, to the contrary notwithstanding.50 
As the Supreme Court noted in The Civil Rights Cases,51 in 
enacting the 1866 Civil Rights Act  
[C]ongress did not assume, under the authority 
given [to it] by the Thirteenth amendment, to adjust 
what may be called the social rights of men and 
races in the community; but only to declare and 
vindicate those fundamental rights which appertain 
to the essence of citizenship, and the enjoyment or 
deprivation of which constitutes the essential 
distinction between freedom and slavery.52  
Thereafter, Congress, seeking to constitutionalize the 1866 
legislation,53 proposed the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
Constitution; the amendment was ratified and officially adopted in 
1868.54 Derisively referred to by some as the “negro equalization 
amendment,”55 Section 1 provides: 
                                                            
50 42 U.S.C § 1981 (2012) (originally enacted as Civil Rights Act of 
1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27). 
51 109 U.S. 3 (1883). 
52 Id. at 22 (emphasis added). On social rights, see infra notes 70–71 
and accompanying text. 
53 See Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370, 386 (1881) (“[T]he Fourteenth 
Amendment . . . secure[s] to the colored race, thereby invested with the rights, 
privileges, and responsibilities of citizenship, the enjoyment of all the civil 
rights that, under the law, are enjoyed by white citizens.”); AKHIL REED AMAR, 
THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 187, 195 (1998) 
(Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment “was consciously designed and widely 
understood to encompass” the Civil Rights Act of 1866.). But see GARRETT 
EPPS, DEMOCRACY REBORN: THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE FIGHT 
FOR RIGHTS IN POST-CIVIL WAR AMERICA 165 (2006) (rejecting the view that 
§ 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment was intended to constitutionalize the 1866 
Civil Rights Act). 
54 One scholar has observed that the Fourteenth Amendment was 
“forced down the throats of the southern political establishment.” Greene, supra 
note 26, at 1009; see also WILLIAM D. WORKMAN, JR., THE CASE FOR THE 
SOUTH 14 (1960) (arguing that the Fourteenth Amendment was “adopted in . . . 
an uncivil, unrighteous and manifestly unconstitutional manner”);Thomas B. 
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All persons born or naturalized in the United States, 
and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens 
of the United States and of the State wherein they 
reside. No State shall make or enforce any law 
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of 
citizens of the United States; nor shall any State 
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law; nor deny to any person 
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the 
laws.56  
Southerners were “terrified” that the Fourteenth Amendment 
“would giv[e] negroes political and social equality with the 
whites,” would “someday be interpreted to preclude laws banning 
interracial marriage,” and would “compel [them] to live with the 
sickening stench of degraded humanity.”57  
 
B. What Rights Were To Be Protected by the 
Fourteenth Amendment? 
 
The text of the Fourteenth Amendment does not expressly 
prohibit racial classifications. As noted by legal historian Michael 
Klarman, “[a]dvocates of abolishing all racial classifications 
proposed suitable language, but it was rejected. Indeed, some 
Radical Republicans opposed ratification because they thought the 
amendment’s limited purpose rendered it a party trick designed 
only for electioneering purposes.”58 Thus, as adopted and ratified, 
the amendment does not explicitly bar the states from engaging in 
any and all forms of racial classification.  
                                                            
Colby, Originalism and the Ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, 107 NW. 
U. L. REV. 1627, 1629 (2013) (arguing that the Fourteenth Amendment “was 
ratified not by the collective assent of the American people but rather at 
gunpoint”). 
55 Colby, supra note 54, at 1647. 
56 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
57 Colby, supra note 54, at 1647 (alterations in original) (footnote 
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
58 MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE 
SUPREME COURT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 18 (2004) 
(quotation marks omitted). 
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That the Fourteenth Amendment did not eliminate all racial 
classifications is unsurprising given the three distinct categories of 
rights recognized in the Reconstruction era: (1) civil rights, (2) 
political rights, and (3) social rights. Civil rights included 
“freedom of contract, property ownership, and court access—rights 
guaranteed in the 1866 Civil Rights Act, for which the Fourteenth 
Amendment was designed to provide a secure constitutional 
foundation.”59 Political rights, including the right to vote, were not 
enjoyed by all persons, as African-American men were deemed 
civilly equal to white men.60 (The Fifteenth Amendment, adopted 
in 1870, prohibits abridgment of the right to vote “on account of 
race, color, or previous condition of servitude.”)61 Social rights 
were understood to include the right to marry a person of another 
race and the right to attend a desegregated school.62 Many, 
                                                            
59 Id. at 19; see also John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, 
Originalism and the Good Constitution, 98 GEO. L.J. 1693, 1762 (2010) (“[T]he 
Fourteenth Amendment was designed to render constitutional the Civil Rights 
Act of 1866, which stated that all citizens should have the same rights as white 
citizens and that if the rights are different under any description, they are not the 
same.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
60 KLARMAN, supra note 58, at 19; JACK M. BALKIN, 
CONSTITUTIONAL REDEMPTION: POLITICAL FAITH IN AN UNJUST WORLD 144 
(2011). 
61 U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1. 
62 KLARMAN, supra note 58, at 19; see also Michael B. Rappaport, 
Originalism and the Colorblind Constitution, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 71, 130 
n.241 (2013) (“Another possible reason why marriage would not be covered by 
the Fourteenth Amendment is that it was regarded as a social right rather than a 
civil right.”); David A. Strauss, Can Originalism Be Saved?, 82 B.U. L. REV. 
1161, 1169 (2012) (discussing the “familiar and important point[] . . . that the 
Reconstruction Congress distinguished among civil, political, and social rights: 
the Fourteenth Amendment, as that Congress conceived it, protected civil rights 
but not political rights (quintessentially the right to vote) or social rights (of 
which the clearest example was the right to marry a person of another race))”; 
Eric Foner, The Original Intent of the Fourteenth Amendment: A Conversation 
with Eric Foner, 6 NEV. L.J. 425, 438 (2005-2006) (“And then there was this 
very amorphous area called social rights or social equality. Nobody who was 
talking about the Fourteenth Amendment except Charles Sumner believed in 
social equality.”); David E. Bernstein, Philip Sober Controlling Philip Drunk: 
Buchanan v. Warley in Historical Perspective, 51 VAND. L. REV. 797, 823 
(1998) (the “Court’s distinction between social rights, which were not protected 
by the Fourteenth Amendment, and civil rights, which were protected, was 
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including some Republicans, opposed the view that African 
Americans should have constitutionally protected social rights.63 
As legal scholar Jack Balkin points out, the concept of social 
equality for African Americans had a “racially charged meaning” 
and was viewed as “a code word for miscegenation and racial 
intermarriage. The idea (or rather the fear) was that the relative 
status of blacks and whites as a group would be altered if society 
had a preponderance of mixed-race children, or if blacks and 
whites regarded themselves as members of the same family.”64 
The Reconstruction-era taxonomy of rights is reflected in Jack 
Balkin’s “tripartite theory of citizenship.”65 The “key point of the 
tripartite theory was that equal citizenship and equality before the 
law meant something less than what it does for us today: civil 
equality, but not political or social equality.”66 Thus, those who 
framed, adopted and considered the meaning of the Fourteenth 
Amendment favored constitutionalizing certain civil rights while 
simultaneously opposing the recognition of constitutionally 
protected political and social rights. Giving blacks the right to vote 
                                                            
arguably consistent with the intent of the framers of the Fourteenth 
Amendment”); Reva Siegel, Why Equal Protection No Longer Protects: The 
Evolving Forms of Status-Enforcing State Action, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1111, 1120 
(1997) (“Social rights were those forms of association that, white Americans 
feared, would obliterate status distinctions and result in the ‘amalgamation’ of 
the races.”). 
63 KLARMAN, supra note 58, at 19. 
64 BALKIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REDEMPTION, supra note 60, at 145; 
see also DUNNING, supra note 45, at 213–14 (arguing that “civil rights and 
political power” had been “almost forced” upon African Americans who craved 
social equality in the form of “mixed schools” and sought the “hideous crime 
against white womanhood”); McConnell, supra note 13, at 1018 (“A significant 
undercurrent in the discussion of social rights was the fear that intermixing 
would lead to miscegenation, and that the theory of the Fourteenth Amendment . 
. . would logically extend to a right of racial intermarriage.”); Rebecca J. Scott, 
Public Rights, Social Equality, and the Conceptual Roots of the Plessy 
Challenge, 106 MICH. L. REV. 777, 781 (2007) (“[S]ocial equality . . . was a 
label . . . enemies had long attempted to pin on the proponents of equal public 
rights in order to associate public rights with private intimacy and thereby to 
trigger the host of fears connected with the image of black men in physical 
proximity to white women.”). 
65 BALKIN, supra note 6, at 222. 
66 Id. at 222–23. 
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and marry persons of another race “in 1866 would have been 
politically explosive”;67 the tripartite theory was thus a matter of 
“political necessity” reflecting “the balance of power and interests 
in American society, the political compromises necessary to ratify 
the Fourteenth Amendment, and the play of forces in the years that 
followed.”68  
Michael McConnell has also recognized the Reconstruction-
epoch “‘social rights argument based on a tripartite division of 
rights, universally accepted at the time but forgotten today, 
between civil rights, political rights, and social rights.”69 And 
Bruce Ackerman has observed that, “[f]or Reconstruction 
Republicans, only three spheres of life”—the civil, political, and 
social—”were worth distinguishing . . . Within this traditional 
trichotomy, the Reconstruction Amendments protected political 
and civil rights but not social rights.”70 
Ignorance or disregard of the tripartite theory and division of 
rights results in an originalist analysis that fails to take into account 
a critical fact: the placement of social rights outside the protective 
scope of the Fourteenth Amendment.71 With regard to school 
segregation, a social rights issue, it is noteworthy that African 
Americans “were almost universally excluded from, or segregated 
in, public schools when the Fourteenth Amendment was 
adopted.”72 “School segregation was infrequently discussed during 
the legislative debates in 1866. Democrats occasionally argued that 
the Civil Rights Act or the Fourteenth Amendment would produce 
horrible consequences, such as compulsory school integration, but 
                                                            
67 Id. at 223. 
68 BALKIN,  CONSTITUTIONAL REDEMPTION,  supra note 60,  at 
146–47. 
69 McConnell, supra note 13, at 1016. 
70 ACKERMAN, supra note 24, at 130. 
71 See id. at 299 (noting the “traditional understandings that placed 
social rights beyond the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment”); Michael C. 
Dorf, Tainted Law, 80 U. CIN. L. REV. 923, 933 n.36 (2012) (“Nineteenth 
century legal thinkers also distinguished a third category of social rights which 
were sometimes thought to be beyond the reach of the law . . . .”); Dorf, supra 
note 15, at 974 n.67 (social rights were “sometimes said to be entirely outside 
the purview of” the Fourteenth Amendment).  
72 KLARMAN, supra note 58, at 19. 
 PROBLEMATICS OF BROWN-IS-ORIGINALIST  609 
Republicans invariably denied such a possibility.”73 These facts 
and points render debatable the proposition that the Fourteenth 
Amendment, at the time of its adoption, provided for a social right 
to racially desegregated schools.  
If the right to attend a desegregated public school was 
considered a social right beyond the scope of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, the traditional and, in the words of Michael 
McConnell, universally accepted distinction between civil, 
political, and social rights calls into question the notion and 
conclusion that Brown is consistent with originalism.  
 
II. BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION 
 
  Does the Fourteenth Amendment prohibit state-mandated 
racial segregation in public schools? A unanimous Supreme Court, 
in an opinion by Chief Justice Earl Warren, answered that question 
in the affirmative in Brown v. Board of Education.74 Because 
“lawyers and judges all fail to study Warren’s words with care, 
choosing instead to see the opinion as a way station on the route to 
some far more glorious principle,”75 this part examines the Court’s 
decision and reasoning in some detail. The Court’s plain language 
is the starting point of this project’s focus and analysis.  
 
A. The Board’s Originalist Arguments  
 
In the 1954 Brown decision Chief Justice Earl Warren noted 
that the Segregation Cases before the Court76 had first been argued 
during the Court’s 1952 Term. During that initial argument, John 
W. Davis, counsel for the school board in the South Carolina 
case,77 noted that “the same Congress” that proposed the 
                                                            
73 Id. 
74 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
75 ACKERMAN, supra note 24, at 128. 
76 In 1952 the Court took jurisdiction over four cases from Kansas, 
South Carolina, Virginia, and Delaware wherein lower courts rejected 
Fourteenth Amendment challenges to state-mandated racial segregation in 
public schools. See Brown, 347 U.S. at 486 n.1. 
77 Davis “was the most accomplished and admired appellate lawyer in 
America.” RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN V. 
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Fourteenth Amendment in June 1866 proceeded in July 1866 “to 
establish or to continue separate schools in the District of 
Columbia .”78 Davis sought to demonstrate to the Court “how 
those who submitted this Amendment and those who adopted it 
conceded it to be, and what their conduct by way of interpretation 
has been since its ratification in 1868.”79 He told the Court that 
thirty of the then thirty-seven states in the union ratified the 
Fourteenth Amendment in 1868, and that twenty-three of those 
thirty states “either then had, or immediately installed, separate 
schools for white and colored children under their public school 
systems. Were they violating the Amendment which they had 
solemnly accepted?”80 
As Chief Justice Warren noted in Brown, the Segregation 
Cases were set for reargument “largely devoted to the 
circumstances surrounding the adoption of the Fourteenth 
Amendment in 1868” and “consideration of the Amendment in 
Congress, [the] ratification by the states, then existing practices in 
racial segregation, and the views of proponents and opponents of 
the Amendment.”81 In the December 1953 reargument, Davis again 
appeared before the Court on behalf of South Carolina. Repeating 
the count-the-states argument he made a year earlier, Davis made 
an original intent/original understanding argument, telling the 
Court that the “overwhelming preponderance of the evidence 
demonstrates that the Congress which submitted, and the state 
legislatures which ratified, the Fourteenth Amendment did not 
contemplate and did not understand that it would abolish 
segregation in public schools.”82 
Davis contended that “when we study the legislation enacted 
by Congress immediately before, immediately after, and during the 
                                                            
BOARD OF EDUCATION AND BLACK AMERICA’S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY 
545 (ed. 2004). 
78 Oral Argument, Briggs v. Elliott, U.S. Sup. Ct. No. 101, Dec. 10, 
1952, in 49 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE UNITED STATES: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 331 (Philip B. Kurland & 
Gerhard Casper eds., 1975) [hereinafter Briggs, Oral Argument]. 
79 Id. at 333. 
80 Id. 
81 Brown, 347 U.S. at 489. 
82 Briggs, Oral Argument, supra note 78, at 481. 
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period of the discussions of the Fourteenth Amendment, there can 
be no question left that Congress did not intend by the Fourteenth 
Amendment to deal with the question of mixed or segregated 
schools.”83 He noted that the Freedmen’s Bureau, established by 
the same Congress that proposed the Fourteenth Amendment, 
“installed separate schools throughout the South.”84 And, he 
argued, during Congressional consideration of the proposed Civil 
Rights Act of 1866 the claim that the law “would do away with the 
separate schools” was denied by the chair of the House Judiciary 
Committee.85 
 
B. The Court’s Decision 
 
In Brown, Chief Justice Warren determined that the sources 
examined in the reargument “cast some light” but were “not 
enough to resolve the problem with which we are faced.86 At best, 
they are inconclusive.”87 The Chief Justice explained that at the 
time of the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment “[i]n the South, 
                                                            
83 Id. at 482. 
84 Id. at 485. 
85 Id. at 486. 
86 Id. at 489. 
87 347 U.S. at 489. On the Court’s inconclusivity conclusion, see 
RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 62 (1995) (“It was unclear, to say 
the least, that the framers or ratifiers of the Fourteenth Amendment had intended 
the equal protection clause to prevent racially segregated public school 
education.”); MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE 
COURTS 156 (1999) (“the very Congress that submitted the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the states for ratification also supported segregated schools in the 
District of Columbia” and the amendment’s supporters gave assurances that the 
amendment would not lead to desegregated schools); Alexander M. Bickel, The 
Original Understanding and the Segregation Decision, 69 HARV. L. REV. 1, 64 
(1955) (“[T]he immediate objectives to which section 1 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment was addressed . . . was not expected in 1866 to apply to 
segregation . . . .”); Michael J. Klarman, An Interpretive History of Modern 
Equal Protection, 90 MICH. L. REV. 213, 252 (1991) (“Evidence regarding the 
original understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment is ambiguous as to a wide 
variety of issues, but not school segregation. Virtually nothing in the 
congressional debates suggests that the Fourteenth Amendment was intended to 
prohibit school segregation, while contemporaneous state practices render such 
an interpretation fanciful . . . .”). 
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the movement toward free common schools, supported by general 
taxation, had not yet taken hold.”88 The education of white children 
“was largely in the hands of private groups” while the “[e]ducation 
of Negroes was almost nonexistent, and practically all of the race 
were illiterate. In fact, any education of Negroes was forbidden by 
law in some states.”89 The impact of the Fourteenth Amendment 
on public education in the northern states “was generally ignored 
in the congressional debates. Even in the North, the conditions of 
public education did not approximate those existing today.”90  
The curriculum was usually rudimentary; ungraded 
schools were common in rural areas; the school 
term was but three months a year in many states; 
and compulsory school attendance was virtually 
unknown. As a consequence it is not surprising that 
there should be so little in the history of the 
Fourteenth Amendment relating to its intended 
effect on public education.91 
Moving to the Court’s early Fourteenth Amendment decisions, 
Chief Justice Warren remarked that in those cases the Court 
interpreted the amendment “as proscribing all state-imposed 
discriminations against the Negro race.”92 The separate-but-equal 
doctrine “did not make its appearance in this [C]ourt until 1896 in 
the case of Plessy v. Ferguson . . . involving not education but 
transportation.”93 Declaring that “we cannot turn the clock back to 
1868 when the [Fourteenth] Amendment was adopted, or even to 
1896 when Plessy v. Ferguson was written,”94 Warren focused 
instead on “public education in the light of its full development 
and its present place in American life throughout the Nation.”95 
                                                            




92 Id. at 490 & n.5 (citing Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1873); 
Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880); Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313 
(1879); Ex Parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1880)). 
93 Id. at 491. 
94 Id. at 492. 
95 Id. at 493. 
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 Today, education is perhaps the most important 
function of state and local governments. 
Compulsory school attendance laws and the great 
expenditures for education both demonstrate our 
recognition of the importance of education to our 
democratic society. It is required in the performance 
of our most basic public responsibilities, even 
service in the armed forces. It is the very foundation 
of good citizenship. Today it is a principal 
instrument in awakening the child to cultural values, 
in preparing him for later professional training, and 
in helping him to adjust normally to his 
environment. In these days, it is doubtful that any 
child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life 
if he is denied the opportunity of an education. Such 
an opportunity, where the state has undertaken to 
provide it, is a right which must be made available 
to all on equal terms.96  
Chief Justice Warren then asked whether segregating children 
by race unconstitutionally deprived children of color of equal 
educational opportunities, even though physical facilities and other 
tangible factors were “equal.”97 Noting the Court’s invalidation of 
segregated education in the graduate school setting,98 he opined 
that the Court’s focus on intangible considerations in those cases 
“apply with added force to children in grade and high schools.”99 
“To separate them from others of similar age and qualifications 
solely because of their race generates a feeling of inferiority as to 
their status in the community that may affect their hearts and 
minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone.”100 Chief Justice 
Warren supported this statement with a finding from the district 
court that heard the Kansas case: 
                                                            
96 Id.  
97 Id. 
98 See id. at 492 (citing Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950); 
McLaurin v. Okla. State Regents for Higher Educ., 339 U.S. 637 (1950); Sipuel 
v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 332 U.S. 631 (1948); Missouri ex rel. 
Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938)). 
99 Id. at 493–94. 
100 Id. 
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 Segregation of white and colored children in public 
schools has a detrimental effect upon the colored 
children. The impact is greater when it has the 
sanction of the law; for the policy of separating the 
races is usually interpreted as denoting the 
inferiority of the negro group. A sense of inferiority 
affects the motivation of the child to learn. 
Segregation with the sanction of law, therefore, has 
a tendency to retard the educational and mental 
development of Negro children and to deprive them 
of some of the benefits they would receive in a 
racially integrated school system.101 
Chief Justice Warren concluded: “Whatever may have been the 
extent of psychological knowledge at the time of Plessy v. 
Ferguson, this finding is amply supported by modern authority. 
Any language in Plessy v. Ferguson contrary to this finding is 
rejected.”102 
Accordingly, Chief Justice Warren wrote, “in the field of 
public education the doctrine of ‘separate but equal’ has no place. 
Separate educational facilities are inherently unequal.”103 The 
plaintiffs and other similarly situated persons had been “deprived 
of the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth 
Amendment.”104 
Brown, a nonoriginalist if not an anti-originalist decision,105 
looked to the role, dynamics, and function of public school 
education at the time of the Court’s 1954 decision. The Court 
                                                            
101 Id. (internal punctuation omitted). 
102 Id. at 494–95 & n.11. The “modern authority” language in the 
quoted text was supported by footnote 11’s citation to social science studies, 
including Dr. Kenneth Clark’s report on the results of his doll test. For more on 
footnote 11, see ACKERMAN, supra note 24, at 132; ANGELO N. ANCHETA, 
SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE AND EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAW 42–58 (2006); ROY 
L. BROOKS, INTEGRATION OR SEPARATION?: A STRATEGY FOR RACIAL 
EQUALITY 13–15 (1996).  
103 Brown, 347 U.S. at 495. 
104 Id. 
105 See RICHARD A. POSNER, REFLECTIONS ON JUDGING 198 (2013) 
(arguing that Brown is a nonoriginalist decision); CROSS, supra note 6, at 92 
(arguing that Brown is “functionally an antioriginalist opinion”). 
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expressly declared that its ruling and analysis were not tied to or in 
any way dictated by events occurring in 1868, when the Fourteenth 
Amendment was adopted, or in 1896, the year in which the Court 
issued its infamous Plessy decision. As legal scholar David Strauss 
has remarked, the Court’s “formal abandonment” of the separate-
but-equal doctrine in the context of public primary and secondary 
schools “was no revolution but just the final step in a common law 
development. . . . Earlier Courts, trying to apply separate but equal, 
kept coming to the conclusion that the particular separate facilities 
before them were not equal.”106 In “taking one further step in a 
well-established progression,” Strauss continued, the Court acted 
“not as the interpreter of the views of mid-nineteenth-century 
politicians, but as a court with responsibility for the evolution—in 
a properly restrained, common law fashion—of the living 
Constitution.”107 
Supporters of the pre-Brown segregationist status quo reacted 
negatively—and on originalist grounds—to the Court’s decision. 
For instance, in March 1956 the vast majority of United States 
Senators and Representatives from southern states issued the 
“Declaration of Constitutional Principles.”108 This declaration, also 
known as the “Southern Manifesto,”109 was drafted by Senators 
Strom Thurmond, Sam Ervin, Harry Byrd, Richard Russell, and 
others.110 Protesting that the “unwarranted decision of the Supreme 
Court in the public school cases is now bearing the fruit always 
                                                            
106 STRAUSS, supra note 18, at 92; see supra note 99 and 
accompanying text. 
107 STRAUSS, supra note 18, at 92. 
108 See 102 CONG. REC. 4255, 4459–61 (1956) (statement of Sen. 
Walter George); id. at 5445 (statement of Sen Strom Thurmond). Albert Gore 
and Estes Kefauver of Tennessee and Lyndon B. Johnson of Texas were “the 
only three southern Senators who did not sign” the Manifesto. Justin Driver, 
Supremacies and the Southern Manifesto, 92 TEX. L. REV. 1053, 1079 (2014).  
109 For an excellent analysis and discussion of the Southern 
Manifesto, see Driver, supra note 108. 
110 See KARL E. CAMPBELL, SENATOR SAM ERVIN, THE LAST OF 
THE FOUNDING FATHERS 5–7 (2007); ROBERT A. CARO, THE YEARS OF 
LYNDON JOHNSON: MASTER OF THE SENATE 785 (2002); DAN T. CARTER, 
THE POLITICS OF RAGE: GEORGE WALLACE, THE ORIGINS OF THE NEW 
CONSERVATISM, AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN POLITICS 86 (2d 
ed. 2000). 
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produced when men substitute naked power for established 
law,”111 the Manifesto presented an originalist critique of Brown.  
 The original Constitution does not mention 
education. Neither does the 14th amendment nor 
any other amendment. The debates preceding the 
submission of the 14th amendment clearly show 
that there was no intent that it should affect the 
systems of education maintained by the States. 
  The very Congress which proposed the 
amendment subsequently provided for segregated 
schools in the District of Columbia. 
  When the amendment was adopted in 1868, 
there were 37 States of the Union. . . . Every one of 
the 26 states that had substantial racial differences 
among its people either approved the operation of 
segregated schools already in existence or 
subsequently established such schools by action of 
the same law-making body which considered the 
14th Amendment.112  
As can be seen, the “Manifesto’s central critique asserted that 
the [Brown] decision violated the original understanding of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. In doing so, the Manifesto placed in the 
foreground precisely the argument that the Court’s opinion in 
Brown sought to force into the background.”113 
 
III. DISCRETIONARY ORIGINALISM AND BROWN 
 
The discussion now turns to the question whether any of the 
various forms of originalism can square with or justify Brown. 
While some originalists have concluded that Brown was wrongly 
decided, others have reached the opposite conclusion. In so doing, 
                                                            
111 102 CONG. REC. at 4459–60. 
112 Id. The Manifesto also approvingly referred to Plessy v. Ferguson, 
stating that the Plessy Court’s validation of the separate-but-equal doctrine 
“became a part of the life of the people of many of the States and confirmed 
their habits, customs, tradition and way of life. It is founded on elemental 
humanity and commonsense, for parents should not be deprived by Government 
of the right to direct the lives and education of their own children.” Id. 
113 Driver, supra note 108, at 1063. 
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all have engaged in discretionary originalism and made outcome-
influential interpretive choices and moves.  
 
A. The Brown-Was-Wrongly-Decided Position 
 
Raoul Berger, the “ur-originalist,”114 addressed the “is Brown 
originalist?” question in his book Government by Judiciary: The 
Transformation of the Fourteenth Amendment.115 While he 
believed that Brown was “a long overdue attempt to rectify the 
grievous wrongs done to the blacks,”116 Berger approached the 
case as a legal historian and asked “whether the Fourteenth 
Amendment authorized the Supreme Court to perform that act. For 
the Court, like every agency of government, may act only within 
the limits of its constitutional powers.”117 
Focusing on the original intent of the framers of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, Berger contended that Brown was wrongly 
decided.118 “Congress had permitted segregated schools in the 
                                                            
114 CROSS, supra note 6, at 11. Berger was one of the earliest 
champions of originalism. 
115 See RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE 
TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (2d ed. 1997). 
116 Id. at 132. 
117 Id. 
118 Berger’s analysis focused on the “‘original intention’—shorthand 
for the meaning attached by the Framers to the words they employed in the 
Constitution and its Amendments.” Id. at 402. He quoted the “archradical” 
Massachusetts Senator Charles Sumner’s view that “‘[e]very Constitution 
embodies the principles of its framers. It is a transcript of their minds.’” Id. at 
410 (quoting Sumner). With respect to the Equal Protection Clause, Berger 
argued that the framers “left abundant evidence that . . . in employing ‘equal 
protection of the laws’ they had in mind only a ban on discrimination with 
respect to a limited category of ‘enumerated’ rights. Disregard of that intention 
starkly poses the issue of whether the Court may ‘interpret’ black to mean 
white.” Id.  
 For more on original intent originalism, see Robert H. Bork, The 
Constitution, Original Design, and Economic Rights, 23 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 
823, 823 (1986) (“original intent is the only legitimate basis for constitutional 
decisionmaking”); Edwin Meese III, Speech Before the American Bar 
Association (July 9, 1985), reprinted in ORIGINALISM: A QUARTER-CENTURY 
OF DEBATE, supra note 6, at 48 (“The text of the document and the original 
intention of those who framed it would be the judicial standard in giving effect 
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District of Columbia from 1864 onward; and Senator Charles 
Sumner vainly fought to abolish segregated Negro schools in the 
District of Columbia.”119 The argument that Congress “steadfastly 
refus[ed] to abolish segregated schools in the District” and then 
sought to “cram desegregation down the throats of the States” was 
not maintainable.120 Berger also noted that public schools in the 
North barred African Americans, regarding them as racially 
inferior and incapable of education:121  
Had the framers proposed to bar segregated schools 
in the North, such interference with state control of 
internal affairs would have imperiled enactment and 
adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment. Such a 
proposal was far from the framers’ minds, as is 
demonstrated by James Wilson’s assurance that the 
parallel Civil Rights Bill—regarded as identical 
with the Fourteenth Amendment, whose purpose 
was to safeguard the Bill from repeal—did not 
                                                            
to the Constitution.”); William H. Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living 
Constitution, 54 TEX. L. REV. 693, 699 (1976) (the Founding Fathers “intended 
the Constitution itself to suggest answers to the manifold problems that they 
knew would confront succeeding generations”); Robert H. Bork, Neutral 
Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 17 (1971) 
(interpreters should “take from the document rather specific values that text or 
history show the framers actually to have intended and which are capable of 
being translated into principled rules”). 
 For influential critiques of original intent originalism, see H. Jefferson 
Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARV. L. REV. 885 
(1985); Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 
B.U. L. REV. 204 (1980). Powell found “no indication that” the Philadelphia 
framers “expected or intended future interpreters to refer to any extratextual 
intention revealed in the convention’s secretly conducted debates.” Powell, 
supra, at 903. As noted by Lawrence Solum, the “strongest implication of 
[Powell’s] article is that original intentions originalism is a self-effacing theory 
because it requires that the Framers’ intentions regarding interpretation be 
respected, but those intentions require that the Framers’ intentions be 
disregarded.” Lawrence B. Solum, District of Columbia v. Heller and 
Originalism, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 923, 929 (2009). 
119 BERGER, supra note 115, at 26 (quotation marks and citations 
omitted). 
120 Id.  
121 See id.  
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require that all children shall attend the same 
schools.122  
Berger found additional evidence that the framers of the 
Fourteenth Amendment did not intend to prohibit school 
segregation in the fact that “the Senate gallery itself was 
segregated” during that body’s deliberation over the amendment.123 
And subsequent to the 1868 adoption of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, Charles Sumner unsuccessfully attempted to move a 
supplementary bill requiring “that State constitutions provide for a 
system of nondiscriminatory public schools.”124 Accordingly, 
Berger concluded, “the imperfect understanding of equal 
protection in 1866 means that the framers did not conceive it in the 
vastly broadened terms given to the phrase by the Warren 
Court.”125 On that view and application of original intent 
originalism, Brown was incorrectly decided.  
Another scholar, Earl Maltz, has remarked that the originalist 
case against Brown is grounded in the argument that “a direct 
constitutional attack on segregated schools was unthinkable in the 
period in which the Fourteenth Amendment was drafted, passed, 
and ratified.”126 Maltz argued that during that time period school 
segregation was common in the northern states and prevalent in the 
lower northern states. Thus, according to Maltz, “any direct-broad-
based effort to attack segregated schools would have carried with it 
substantial political risks.”127 Republicans crafted the Fourteenth 
Amendment “to appeal to swing voters in the post-Civil War 
electorate” and “mainstream Republicans repeatedly assured those 
voters that Section 1 would have only a minimal impact on 
Northern state laws—a claim they could not make if Section 1 had 
                                                            
122 Id. Wilson was the chairman of the House Judiciary Committee. 
123 Id. at 139. 
124 Id. at 140. 
125 Id. at 141; see also id. at 151 (“There was no need . . . to write 
segregation into the text” of the Fourteenth Amendment “because confessedly 
no one then imagined that the equal protection clause might affect school 
segregation.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
126 Earl Maltz, Originalism and the Desegregation Decisions—A 
Response to Professor McConnell, 13 CONST. COMMENT. 223, 228 (1996) 
[hereinafter Maltz, Originalism and the Desegregation Decisions]. 
127 Id. 
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been generally understood to outlaw segregated schools.”128 And 
as Republicans were not willing to attack segregated schools in the 
District of Columbia, the “contextual evidence strongly suggests 
that the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment did not believe that 
they were outlawing segregation in public schools.”129 
Applying an original intent methodology, Berger and Maltz 
marshalled evidence demonstrating the framers’ no-desegregation 
intent and unflinchingly concluded that Brown was wrongly 
decided. As they demonstrate, the Congress that framed the 
Fourteenth Amendment simultaneously established and maintained 
racially segregated public schools in the District of Columbia, 
which rendered problematic the proposition that segregation 
permitted in the District was to be prohibited in the states. In 
addition, the argument that the amendment would outlaw 
segregated schools was not politically palatable. And legislative 
efforts to abolish segregated schools, both within and outside the 
District, failed. Given these facts, there is a sound basis for the 
conclusion that the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment did not 
intend to prohibit racial segregation in public schools. 
 
B. The Brown-Was-Correctly-Decided Position 
 
1. Robert Bork 
 
Discretionary originalism is on full display in Robert Bork’s 
varying originalist analyses of Brown. In his 1971 article Neutral 
Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, Bork addressed 
the intent of the men who added the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
                                                            
128 Id. at 228–29; see also Earl M. Maltz, A Dissenting Opinion To 
Brown, 20 S. ILL. U. L.J. 93, 94 (1995) [hereinafter Maltz, A Dissenting 
Opinion] (The Fourteenth Amendment “was in large measure a campaign 
document, designed to outline the Republican program of Reconstruction for the 
upcoming election of 1866.”). 
129 Maltz, Originalism and the Desegregation Decisions, supra note 
126, at 229; Maltz, A Dissenting Opinion, supra note 128, at 95 (noting that 
Republicans continued to support segregated schools in the District of 
Columbia, and arguing that the suggestion “that Republicans would at the same 
time act against school segregation by a nationally applicable constitutional 
amendment is to attribute to them an almost Orwellian mentality”). 
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Constitution.130 He stated that some of those men believed “that 
blacks were entitled to purchase property from any willing seller 
but not to attend integrated schools, or that they were entitled to 
serve on juries but not to imtermarry with whites, or that they were 
entitled to equal physical facilities but that the facilities should be 
separate.”131 The Brown Court could not “conceivably know how 
these long-dead men would have resolved these issues had they 
considered, debated, and voted on each of them.”132  
However, Bork argued, the Court did know that the Fourteenth 
Amendment “was intended to enforce a core idea of black equality 
against governmental discrimination”133 and had to “choose a 
general principle of equality that applies to all cases.”134 In his 
view, this (his) equality principle justified choosing Brown’s no-
segregation rule over Plessy’s separate-but-equal doctrine.135  
Bork made two interpretative choices. First, he noted but then 
set aside the long-dead men’s views on the Fourteenth Amendment 
because the Court could not know how the deceased would have 
resolved or voted on school segregation and other issues. Second, 
Bork formulated and applied his unspecified and undefined core of 
black equality. What constitutes the core and the periphery, how 
“equality” is conceptualized, and what is and is not subject to the 
equality mandate are critical but unaddressed questions. Bork did 
not seek to discern the framers’ intent with regard to the issue of 
the constitutionality of school segregation. His reasoning, analysis, 
and conclusion are just that—his and not the framers. 
Bork returned to the Brown and originalism subject in his book 
The Tempting of America: The Political Seduction of the Law.136 
He observed that the “great and correct decision” in Brown “was 
supported by a very weak opinion.”137 Moving from an original 
intent to an original understanding approach,138 Bork stated that the  
                                                            
130 Bork, supra note 118. 
131 Id. at 14. 
132 Id. 
133 Id. 
134 Id. at 14–15. 
135 See id. at 15. 
136 BORK, supra note 14. 
137 Id. at 75. 
138 Original understanding originalism focuses on the Constitution’s 
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[I]nescapable fact is that those who ratified the 
amendment did not think it outlawed segregated 
education or segregation in any aspect of life. If the 
ratifiers had intended segregation as the central 
meaning of the equal protection clause, it is 
impossible to see how later studies on the baleful 
psychological effects of segregation could change 
that meaning. . . . It is difficult to believe that those 
who ratified the fourteenth amendment and also 
passed or continued in force segregation did not 
similarly understand the psychological effects of 
what they did. They didn’t care.139  
Having concluded that the ratifiers did not seek to ban 
segregation of any kind,140 Bork nonetheless curiously posits that 
the result in Brown “is consistent with, indeed is compelled by, the 
original understanding of the fourteenth amendment’s equal 
protection clause.”141 Consider his path to that conclusion: The 
Equal Protection Clause does not mention segregation; the debates 
concerning the clause did not suggest that segregation was being 
constitutionalized; and the ratifiers “probably assumed that 
segregation was consistent with equality but they were not 
addressing segregation.”142  
In Bork’s view, when the Court decided Brown in 1954 “it had 
been apparent for some time that segregation rarely if ever 
produced equality.”143 The Court was thus “faced with a situation 
in which the courts would have to go on forever entertaining 
                                                            
ratifiers as it was their action and understanding of what the framers intended 
that “gave legal life to the otherwise dead words on paper drafted by the 
Philadelphia Convention and the Congresses proposing the amendments.” 
Kesavan & Paulsen, supra note 19, at 1137.   
139 BORK, supra note 14, at 75–76; see also id. at 82 (“[T]he ratifiers 
had no objection to the psychological harm segregation inflicted.”). 
140 In reaching this conclusion, Bork also assumed that Plessy v. 
Ferguson “correctly represented the original understanding of the fourteenth 
amendment” and that the ratifiers of the amendment assumed that “equality and 
state-compelled separation of the races were consistent.” Id. at 81. 
141 Id. at 76. 
142 Id. at 82. 
143 Id.  
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litigation about primary schools, secondary schools, colleges, 
washrooms, golf courses, swimming pools, drinking fountains, and 
the endless variety of facilities that were segregated, or else the 
separate-but-equal doctrine would have to be abandoned.”144  
Bork determined that the Court had to make a choice between 
two options, both “mutually inconsistent” with “one aspect of the 
original understanding”: allow segregation and abandon the “quest 
for equality,” or “forbid segregation in order to achieve 
equality.”145 The Court chose the latter. “[I]t is obvious the Court 
must choose equality and prohibit state-sanctioned segregation. 
The purpose that brought the fourteenth amendment into being was 
equality before the law, and equality, not separation, was written 
into the text.”146 An opinion in Brown based on this approach 
“would have clearly been rooted in the original understanding, and 
its legitimacy would have been enhanced for those troubled by the 
way in which the Court arrived at a moral result without 
demonstrating its mooring in the historic Constitution.”147  
Bork’s choice of “equality” over state-imposed segregation is 
neither obvious nor compelled. The text of the Equal Protection 
Clause does not facially require equality; rather, it requires the 
equal protection of the laws, a vague and not self-defining 
phrase.148 Nor is the text of the clause inconsistent with “separate 
but equal” as “[t]here is nothing in the term ‘equal protection’ that 
seems to forbid separation, even separation on grounds ordinarily 
considered invidious, such as sex and race.”149 On that view, 
separate facilities meeting some standard or metric of equality 
would not violate the clause as written, understood and applied in 
this country prior to Brown. Whether that pre-Brown view is 
consistent with (Bork’s variant of) originalism is the question. As 
previously noted, Bork concluded that the ratifiers of the 
Fourteenth Amendment did not intend to outlaw segregation. Yet, 
and as he did in 1971, Bork formulated his (and not the framers’ or 




147 Id. at 82–83. 
148 See Richard A. Posner, Bork and Beethoven, 42 STAN. L. REV. 
1365, 1375 (1990). 
149 RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 344 (2008). 
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ratifers’) own value-partial concept of equality,150 constructed a 
dichotomous “equality”-or-segregationist world, and declared that 
the Court had to choose equality over segregation. These 
contestable choices and discretionary moves ignore facts and 
history showing that “segregation was not necessarily contrary to 
this nation’s notion of equality” in the 1866–1868 period or 
thereafter.151 Bork’s position that the Court made the correct in 
choice in 1954, whether correct or not, is not grounded in the 
framers’ and ratifiers’ understanding of the Fourteenth 
Amendment as applied to school segregation (a point he concedes). 
Moreover, Bork’s analysis does not contemplate that those who 
proposed and adopted the Fourteenth Amendment did not seek to 
protect or promote social rights for African Americans, including 
the social right to attend a desegregated public school.152  
The result in Brown is consistent, not with the original 
understanding of those who ratified the Fourteenth Amendment, 
but with Bork’s discretionary and unconstrained interpretive 
approach to the school segregation issue. His analysis is 
nonoriginalism cloaked in the garb of originalism.  
 
2. Justice Antonin Scalia 
 
What has another prominent originalist, Justice Antonin Scalia, 
said about Brown?153  
Justice Scalia is an advocate of the original public meaning 
variant of originalism. “[T]he Great Divide with regard to 
constitutional interpretation is not that between Framers’ intent and 
                                                            
150 See TRIBE & DORF, supra note 23, at 80 (“[H]ow can [Bork] 
select a meaning for equality in a value-neutral way?”). 
151 Ronald Turner, Was “Separate But Equal” Constitutional?: 
Borkian Originalism and Brown, 4 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 229, 259 
(1995).  
152 See supra notes 61–63 and accompanying text. 
153 Justice Scalia has also made a traditionalist defense of Brown, 
grounding his analysis of the Equal Protection Clause in the nation’s tradition 
and history. See Ronald Turner, Were Separate-But-Equal and 
Antimiscegenation Laws Constitutional?: Applying Scalian Traditionalism to 
Brown and Loving, 40 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 285 (2003). For a discussion of the 
difference between originalism and traditionalism, see infra notes 238–42 and 
accompanying text.  
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objective meaning, but rather that between original meaning 
(whether derived from Framers’ intent or not) and current 
meaning.”154 Justice Scalia looks for “the original meaning of the 
                                                            
154 Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The 
Role of United States Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A 
MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 38 (Amy 
Guttman ed., 1997) (bracketed material added).  
 For more on original public meaning originalism, see Kesavan & Paulsen, 
supra note 19, at 1131 (the words and phrases of the Constitution must be 
applied “in accordance with the meaning they would have had at the time they 
were adopted as law, within the political and linguistic community that adopted 
the text as law”); id. at 1132 (“original, objective-public-meaning textualism” 
asks “how the words and phrases, and structure (and sometimes even the 
punctuation marks!) would have been understood by a hypothetical, objective, 
reasonably well-informed reader of those words and phrases, in context, at the 
time they were adopted”) (citation omitted); Gary Lawson, Delegation and 
Original Meaning, 88 VA. L. REV. 327, 398 (2002) (original public meaning 
originalism “is a hypothetical inquiry that asks how a fully informed public 
audience, knowing all that there is to know about the Constitution and the 
surrounding world, would understand a particular provision”); Gary Lawson & 
Guy Seidman, Originalism as a Legal Enterprise, 23 CONST. COMMENT. 47, 48 
(2006) (“when interpreting the Constitution, the touchstone is . . . the 
hypothetical understandings of a reasonable person who is artificially 
constructed by lawyers”) (citation omitted).  
 For critiques of original public meaning originalism, see Larry Alexander, 
Originalism, The Why and the What, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 539, 541 (2013) 
(noting that original public meaning originalism’s “hypothetical person cannot 
be nonarbitrarily constructed”); Richard S. Kay, Original Intention and Public 
Meaning in Constitutional Interpretation, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 703, 722 (2009) 
(arguing that the “perfect objectivity” of the fictional reasonable person “must 
be compromised the moment we inject him or her into a real factual context,” 
and that the choices made “as to education, region, vocation and the information 
he or she possessed . . . may make a difference in the resulting interpretation”); 
id. (“And, of course, it would not be surprising if a judicial interpreter were to 
hit upon a reasonable speaker who might view the relevant language as 
supporting a rule that the interpreter thinks a proper constitution ought to 
have.”). See also Ilya Somin, Originalism and Political Ignorance, 97 MINN. L. 
REV. 625, 643, 667 (2012) (noting that in eighteenth and nineteenth century 
America “literacy levels were much lower, and most people had to work longer 
hours, leaving less time for learning about political issues,” and arguing that the 
“reality of widespread political ignorance poses a serious challenge for original 
meaning originalism” as “there may not be any clear original meaning of a 
constitutional provision because a rationally ignorant electorate simply did not 
know about the issue”). 
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text, not always what the original draftsmen intended.”155 While 
originalists will not agree “as to what the original meaning was” or 
“how that original meaning applies to the situation before the 
court . . . the originalist at least knows what he is looking for: the 
original meaning of the text.”156 
Justice Scalia has observed that originalism, done correctly, 
“requires the consideration of an enormous mass of material” and 
necessitates “immersing oneself in the political and intellectual 
atmosphere of the time—somehow placing out of mind knowledge 
that we have which an earlier age did not, and putting on beliefs, 
attitudes, philosophies, prejudices, and loyalties that are not those 
of our day.”157 Having at one time confessed “that in a crunch I 
may prove to be a faint-hearted originalist” who would invalidate 
“a statute that imposes the punishment of flogging,”158 Justice 
Scalia recently declared that he now attempts to be a 
“stouthearted” and “honest originalist.”159 
How has Justice Scalia the originalist interpreted and applied 
the Equal Protection Clause? He has instructed that the “[d]enial of 
equal protection” is unconstitutional, and he answers “the question 
of what constitutes a denial of equal protection” “on the basis of 
the ‘time-dated’ meaning of equal protection in 1868.”160 Did that 
time-dated meaning outlaw school segregation? Appearing in 2009 
with Justice Stephen G. Breyer at a program at the University of 
                                                            
155 Scalia, supra note 154, at 38; see also District of Columbia v. 
Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 576 (2008) (the Court was “guided by the principle that 
the Constitution was written to be understood by the voters; its words and 
phrases are used in their normal and ordinary as distinguished from technical 
meaning”). 
156 Scalia, supra note 154, at 45. 
157 Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 
849, 856–57 (1989). 
158 Id. at 864; but cf. Randy E. Barnett, Scalia’s Infidelity: A Critique 
of “Faint-Hearted” Originalism, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 7 (2006) (discussing the 
ways that Justice Scalia escapes Originalism when it is convenient for him to do 
so). 
159 Jennifer Senior, In Conversation With Antonin Scalia, N.Y. MAG. 
(Oct. 6, 2013), http://nymag.com/news/features/antonin-scalia-2013-10/; 
MARCIA COYLE, THE ROBERTS COURT: THE STRUGGLE FOR THE 
CONSTITUTION 165 (2013). 
160 Scalia, supra note 154, at 148–49. 
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Arizona, the Justices’ conversation turned to the Equal Protection 
Clause. Justice Breyer said to his colleague: “Where would you be 
with school desegregation? It’s certainly clear that at the time they 
passed the 14th Amendment, which says people should be treated 
equally, there was school segregation and they didn’t think they 
were ending it.”161 (This question is posed to Justice Scalia “so 
often in his public appearances that he will say things like ‘Waving 
the bloody shirt of Brown again, eh?’”)162 Justice Scalia initially 
responded, “As for Brown v. Board of Education, I think I would 
have . . .,” before stating that he would have voted with the dissent 
in Plessy v. Ferguson.163  
More recently, in their book Reading Law: The Interpretation 
of Legal Texts, Justice Scalia and Bryan Garner submit that a 
“frequent line of attack against originalism consists in appeal to 
popular Supreme Court decisions that are assertedly based on a 
rejection of original meaning.”164 Noting that Brown is the most 
often cited weapon wielded in this attack, Scalia and Garner write 
that  
[T]he text of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth 
Amendments, and in particular the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, can 
reasonably be thought to prohibit all laws designed 
to assert the separateness and superiority of the white 
race, even those that purport to treat the races 
equally. Justice John Marshall Harlan took this 
position in his powerful (and thoroughly originalist) 
dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson.165  
Plessy, one of the Court’s anti-canon decisions,166 upheld 
                                                            
161 Adam Liptak, From 19th Century View, Desegregation is a Test, 
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/10/us/10bar.htm 
(quoting Justice Breyer). 
162 Margaret Talbot, Supreme Confidence, THE NEW YORKER, Mar. 
28, 2005, http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2005/03/28/supreme-
confidence. 
163 Liptak, supra note 161 (internal quotation omitted). 
164 ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE 
INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 87 (2012). 
165 Id. 
166 See Akhil Reed Amar, Plessy v. Ferguson and the Anti-Canon, 39 
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against an equal protection challenge Louisiana’s Separate Car 
Law mandating “equal but separate accommodations for the white, 
and colored races” on railway cars.167 By a 7-1 vote, the Court held 
that Louisiana’s law was a “reasonable regulation” that did not 
violate the Equal Protection Clause.168 Reflecting the 
Reconstruction-era taxonomy of civil, political, and social 
rights,169 the Court opined that Fourteenth Amendment “equality” 
was not “intended to abolish distinctions based upon color, or to 
enforce social, as distinguished from political, equality, or to a 
commingling of the two races upon terms unsatisfactory to 
either.”170 “If the civil and political rights of both races be equal, 
one cannot be inferior to the other civilly or politically. If one race 
be inferior to the other socially, the constitution of the United 
States cannot put them upon the same plane.”171 Interestingly, the 
Court also mentioned state-mandated “separate schools for white 
and colored children” as an illustrative example of laws “generally, 
if not universally, recognized as within the competency of state 
legislatures.”172 
Justice Harlan’s lone dissent made clear his view that “[i]n 
respect of civil rights, all citizens are equal before the law,” and 
that race must not be taken into account when “civil rights as 
guarantied by the supreme law of the land are involved.”173 The 
“real meaning” of the Separate Car Law was that “colored citizens 
are so far inferior and degraded that they cannot be allowed to sit 
in public coaches occupied by white citizens.”174 As Homer 
                                                            
PEPP. L. REV. 75 (2011); Jamal Greene, The Anticanon, 125 HARV. L. REV. 
379, 412–17 (2011). 
167 Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 540 (1896) (quoting Louisiana 
statute). 
168 Id. at 550. 
169 See supra notes 58–69 and accompanying text. 
170 Plessy, 163 U.S. at 544 (emphasis added). 
171 Id. at 551–52. 
172 Id. at 544. 
173 Id. at 559 (emphasis added) (Harlan, J. dissenting). 
174 Id. at 560; id. at 557 (“Every one knows that the statute in question 
had its origin in the purpose, not so much to exclude white persons from railroad 
cars occupied by blacks, as to exclude colored people from coaches occupied by 
or assigned to white persons.”). 
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Plessy’s civil right to purchase a ticket and ride in a railway car 
with whites had been denied, Justice Harlan concluded that the at-
issue law violated the Equal Protection Clause.175 
Justice Harlan then made clear that he was not arguing for or 
endorsing the social equality of African Americans and whites: 
[S]ocial equality no more exists between two races 
when traveling in a passenger coach or a public 
highway than when members of the same races sit 
by each other in a street car or in the jury box, or 
stand or sit with each other in a political assembly, 
or when they use in common the streets of a city or 
town, or when they are in the same room for the 
purpose of having their names placed on the registry 
of voters, or when they approach the ballot box in 
order to exercise the high privilege of voting.176 
Justice Harlan’s dissent is also known for his metaphoric 
conception of a constitution blind to color and caste “In view of the 
Constitution, in the eye of the law, there is in this country no 
superior, dominant, ruling class of citizens. There is no caste here. 
Our Constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates 
classes among citizens.”177 That passage is preceded by Justice 
Harlan’s declaration that “the white race deems itself to be the 
dominant race in this country. And so it is, in prestige, in 
achievements, in education, in wealth, and in power. So, I doubt 
                                                            
175 John McGinnis and Michael Rappaport have urged that “the law 
prevented Homer Plessy from having an equal right to contract for the carriage 
in which he wanted to sit,” thereby violating the Fourteenth Amendment which, 
in turn, was designed to constitutionalize the Civil Rights Act of 1866. John O. 
McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, David Souter’s Bad Constitutional History, 
WALL ST. J., June 14, 2010, http://www.wsj.com/articles/ 
SB10001424052748703509404575300740568539352. 
176 Plessy, 163 U.S. at 561 (Harlan, J., dissenting); see also Civil 
Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 59 (1883) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (“Whether one 
person will permit or maintain social relations with another is a matter with 
which government has no concern. I agree that if one citizen chooses not to hold 
social intercourse with another, he is not and cannot be made amenable to the 
law for his conduct in that regard; for no legal right of a citizen is violated by the 
refusal of others to maintain merely social relations with him,” even upon 
grounds of race.).  
177 Plessy, 163 U.S. at 559 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
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not, it will continue to be for all time, if it remains true to its great 
heritage and holds fast to the principles of constitutional 
liberty.”178  
Justice Harlan thus endorsed “white superiority in the very 
paragraph in which he claimed fealty to colorblindness.”179 He was 
acutely conscious of race and racial hierarchy180 and “believed in 
the centrality of race and in the legitimacy of racial thinking.”181 A 
“person of his time,”182 Justice Harlan joined the Court’s pre-
Plessy decision rejecting an equal protection challenge to an 
Alabama criminal law’s penalty-enhancement for adultery and 
fornication engaged in by black-white couples.183 And he wrote the 
Court’s opinion in a post-Plessy decision holding that a county 
school board did not violate the Equal Protection Clause when it 
closed an all-black high school and continued to operate a high 
school for whites;184 he deemed the board’s “separate and unequal 
scheme” to be reasonable and therefore constitutional.185  
What does or could Justice Scalia mean when he says that he 
would have voted with Harlan in Plessy and characterized the 
Plessy dissent as “thoroughly originalist”? Does Justice Scalia 
recognize, as did Justice Harlan, the Reconstruction-era distinction 
between civil, political, and social rights? Does Justice Scalia 
agree with Justice Harlan that the issue of the constitutionality of 
state-mandated racial segregation in railways cars concerned the 
civil but not the social rights of African Americans? If he does, 
must he not then conclude that the right to attend a desegregated 
school is not a right subject to and protected by the Fourteenth 
                                                            
178 Id. 
179 Ian Haney López, “A Nation of Minorities”: Race, Ethnicity, and 
Reactionary Colorblindness, 59 STAN. L. REV. 985, 993 (2007). 
180 See Davison M. Douglas, The Surprising Role of Racial Hierarchy 
in the Civil Rights Jurisprudence of Justice John Marshall Harlan, 15 U. PA. J. 
CONST. L. 1037 (2013). 
181 Edward A. Purcell, Jr., The Particularly Dubious Case of Hans v. 
Louisiana: An Essay on Law, Race, History, and “Federal Courts,” 81 N.C. L. 
REV. 1927, 2021 (2003). 
182 Id. 
183 See Pace v. Alabama, 106 U.S. 583 (1883). 
184 See Cumming v. Richmond Bd. of Ed., 175 U.S. 528 (1899). 
185 KLARMAN, supra note 58, at 45. 
 PROBLEMATICS OF BROWN-IS-ORIGINALIST  631 
Amendment? And if Justice Scalia does not recognize the 
Reconstruction-era understanding of rights, has he disregarded 
information pertinent to determining the 1868 “time-dated” 
meaning of the Equal Protection Clause? Given these questions, 
Justice Scalia’s statement that he would have voted with Justice 
Harlan in Plessy is quite problematic. 
And what is originalist, thoroughly or otherwise, about Justice 
Harlan’s dissent? To reiterate, Justice Harlan recognized civil but 
not social rights, endorsed white supremacy, and voted against 
equal protection challenges to racial discrimination in social rights 
cases. Justice Scalia’s contention that, per Justice Harlan, the Equal 
Protection Clause prohibits “all laws designed to assert the 
separateness and superiority of the white race”186 is flatly 
contradicted by Justice Harlan’s judicial opinions and clearly 
stated racial views. Justice Scalia wrongly attributes to Justice 
Harlan positions and views that Harlan did not hold.  
 
3. Michael McConnell 
 
Michael McConnell’s much-cited Originalism and the 
Desegregation Decisions article addressed the “supposed 
inconsistency between Brown and the original meaning of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.”187 Examining “the legal thinking of the 
antagonists in the debate” over the Civil Rights Act of 1875,188 
McConnell argues that “actions taken by Congress from 1868 to 
1875 to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment and the congressional 
deliberations over those measures . . . present the best evidence of 
the original understanding of the meaning of the Amendment as it 
bears on the issue of school segregation.”189  
This postoriginalist choice and move190 shifts the temporal 
focus away from the 1866–1868 proposal and ratification period. 
i.e., away from the actual period in which the Fourteenth 
Amendment was proposed, debated, and ratified. McConnell 
                                                            
186 SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 164, at 88 (emphasis added). 
187 McConnell, supra note 13, at 952. 
188 Id. at 954. 
189 Id. at 984. 
190 See POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK, supra note 149, at 344. 
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acknowledges that proof “that a majority of the members of 
Congress between 1871 and 1875 supported legislation premised 
on the unconstitutionality of school segregation does not 
conclusively prove that this was the predominant understanding of 
those who drafted and ratified the Amendment in the period 1866 
to 1868.”191 What matters is “that a very substantial portion of the 
Congress, including leading framers of the Amendment, 
subscribed to the view that school segregation violates the 
Fourteenth Amendment.”192  
McConnell postulates continuity in Congressional opinion 
from the time of the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1875,193 stating that a number 
of “leaders of the movement to adopt the Fourteenth Amendment” 
supported the movement for the 1875 legislation.194 According to 
Michael Klarman, McConnell neglects the possibility that values 
changed in the interim” between the adoption of the Fourteenth 
Amendment and the 1875 legislation and “pays relatively little 
heed to the possibility of a . . . dramatic opinion shift . . . as to the 
desirability of school integration between 1866-68 and 1875.”195 
As noted by Klarman, “School desegregation, which in most of the 
North was anathema at the time of the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
ratification, had been largely effectuated (at least in formal legal 
enactments) by the 1880s,” and “it seems clear that Northern 
opinion in 1875 was more favorable toward school desegregation 
than it had been in 1866-68. Thus Congressional debates on the 
1875 CRA seem unreliable evidence as to what congressmen 
thought the Fourteenth Amendment meant when they passed it in 
1866.”196 
McConnell notes, further, that Congress struck a provision 
prohibiting school segregation from the bill that was ultimately 
                                                            
191 McConnell, supra note 13, at 1105. 
192 Id. at 1093. 
193 18 Stat. 335 (1875). This act was struck down in The Civil Rights 
Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883). 
194 McConnell, supra note 13, at 1105. 
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(1995). 
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enacted as the 1875 Civil Rights Act.197 But that failure to 
proscribe racial segregation in the schools did not dissuade him 
from concluding that Brown is consistent with the original 
meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Turning to Brown, McConnell observes that the Court’s 
opinion “gives every impression that the Court thought it was 
struggling against the historical understanding and original 
meaning of the Constitution—an impression that, I am now 
convinced, was unnecessary and even misleading.”198 He 
acknowledges that “the practice of school segregation was 
widespread in both Southern and Northern states, as well as the 
District of Columbia, at the time of the proposal and ratification of 
the Amendment, and almost certainly enjoyed the support of a 
majority of the population even at the height of Reconstruction.”199 
McConnell thus doubts that Congress would have proposed or that 
the people of the states would have ratified “an Amendment 
understood to outlaw so deeply ingrained an institutional 
practice.”200 One could understandably conclude that this 
acknowledgement and doubt foreclosed any argument that a—or 
the—meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibited racial 
segregation in the public schools. But McConnell’s originalist 
analysis evades this conclusion by focusing not on the 1866–1868 
framing/adoption period but on his chosen 1868–1875 post-
ratification timeframe.  
McConnell’s analysis does not adequately account for the 
Reconstruction-era distinction between civil, political, and social 
rights. According to Balkin, “Everyone in the debates over the 
1875 Civil Rights Act accepted the basic distinction, and the two 
sides were merely arguing over whether access to public education 
was a civil or social right. The really important question, then, is 
not whether Brown can be squared with original public meaning; it 
is whether conservative originalism can reject the 
                                                            
197 See McConnell, supra note 13, at 1069, 1082; see also Cass R. 
Sunstein, Black on Brown, 90 VA. L. REV. 1649, 1659 (2004) (noting that the 
“efforts to ban segregated schools” in the 1875 Civil Rights Act “ultimately 
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198 Id. at 1132. 
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civil/political/social distinction.”201 If the original public meaning 
includes knowledge and acceptance of that distinction (one known 
to McConnell),202 the tripartite theory “offered in order to explain 
and justify giving blacks and women a limited form of equality” is 
part of that meaning.203 That equality-limiting meaning does not 
support the Brown-is-originalist position. 
It is also noteworthy that in the year following the enactment of 
the 1875 Civil Rights Act Democratic presidential candidate 
Samuel J. Tilden received more popular votes than his opponent, 
Republican Rutherford B. Hayes, but did not receive a majority of 
the votes in the Electoral College. As the election results in 
Florida, Louisiana, and South Carolina were disputed,204 Congress 
created a fifteen-person commission, composed of eight 
Republicans and seven Democrats, to resolve the election issue.205 
The commission, with the deciding vote cast by Justice Joseph P. 
Bradley (a Republican) ruled in favor of Hayes.206 Hayes then 
promised Democrats that, in exchange for their acceptance of the 
commission’s decision, he would withdraw federal troops from the 
south and would not enforce the Fifteenth Amendment’s ban on 
racial discrimination in voting.207 The deal was accepted and 
Hayes assumed the presidency; thereafter, federal troops were 
withdrawn from the south.208  
The Hayes-Tilden Compromise betrayed and ended 
Reconstruction and was followed by “a sea-change in public, 
intellectual, governmental and legal opinion. Support and 
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RECONSTRUCTION 248–49 (2008); ROY MORRIS, JR., FRAUD OF THE 
CENTURY: RUTHERFORD B. HAYES, SAMUEL TILDEN, AND THE STOLEN 
ELECTION OF 1876, at 3 (2003); C. VANN WOODWARD, REUNION AND 
REACTION: THE COMPROMISE OF 1877 AND THE END OF RECONSTRUCTION 
(1951). 
208 See LANE, supra note 207, at 248. 
 PROBLEMATICS OF BROWN-IS-ORIGINALIST  635 
protection for the rights of black citizens passed away and were 
replaced by the regime of Jim Crow.”209 Expanding McConnell’s 
chosen 1868–1875 time period by a few years would bring into the 
picture a key development—the end of Reconstruction and the 
beginning of Jim Crow—that may be of critical if not dispositive 
relevance to the discussion of the originalism and school 
segregation topic.  
 
4. Jack Balkin 
 
Now consider Jack Balkin’s “framework originalism” and “text 
and principle” method. Balkin argues that “[f]idelity to original 
meaning as original semantic content does not require that we must 
apply the equal protection clause the same way that people at the 
time of enactment would have expected it would be applied.”210 In 
his view, faithfulness to original meaning requires knowledge of 
the concepts referenced in the Equal Protection Clause at the time 
of its 1868 adoption.211 This analysis requires knowledge of 
whether the “words in the clause were understood nonliterally” and 
“whether some words referred to generally recognized terms of 
art.”212 
For Balkin, the original meaning of the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s equal protection mandate is enforced “today 
because the text continues to require it, just as the text continues to 
require that the president must be thirty-five years old. How we 
apply the principles of equal protection, however, may well be 
different from what people expected in 1868, based in part on our 
contemporary understandings and a history of previous 
constitutional constructions.”213 Balkin insists that his framework 
originalism is compatible with living constitutionalism,214 although 
“many originalists will read Balkin to be a living constitutionalist 
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in disguise—and may not let him into their club.”215  
Balkin has identified four types of treatment prohibited by the 
Equal Protection Clause: (1) laws making arbitrary and 
unreasonable distinctions between persons; (2) class legislation 
unjustifiably singling out a group for special benefits or special 
burdens; (3) caste legislation creating or maintaining a 
subordinated or disfavored group; and (4) legislation restricting or 
abridging the basic rights of citizenship and treating persons as 
second-class citizens.216 “These four conceptions are principles 
underlying the equal protection clause” and are “heuristics, aids to 
understanding the text and its principled commitments.”217 
Reasoning that a law requiring racial segregation in public schools 
is an obvious example of the aforementioned types of 
unconstitutional and unequal treatment,218 Balkin concludes that 
Brown is an “obvious and uncomplicated application[ ] of the 
principles underlying the Fourteenth Amendment,” and the Court’s 
decision is a constitutional construction “foundational to our 
understanding of the equal protection clause.”219  
Balkin’s framework originalism identifies principles and 
concepts to be referenced in deciding whether a claimed right is 
one protected by the Equal Protection Clause. The content of those 
principles and how they are to be applied is not bound by or to an 
application of the clause expected by those living at the time of its 
adoption. The interpreter is free to use her own discretion and 
judgment as to the content of equal protection principles as well as 
to the application of those principles to allegedly unconstitutional 
conduct. That Balkin’s framework originalism leads him to a 
Brown-is-originalist conclusion is not surprising given his focus, 
not on the Fourteenth Amendment’s nineteenth-century proposal 
and adoption period, but contemporary understandings and prior 
constructions of the Equal Protection Clause in the specific context 
of public school segregation.  
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5. Steven Calabresi and Michael Perl 
 
A more recent originalist effort to justify Brown is found in 
Steven Calabresi and Michael Perl’s article Originalism and 
Brown v. Board of Education.220 The authors set out an analysis 
that would not “have been as clear a pronouncement to lay people 
on the unconstitutionality of public school education as was Chief 
Justice Earl Warren’s opinion for the Supreme Court in Brown . . . 
The legal argument we make is complex and could easily have 
been missed by many if not most Americans living in 1868.”221 
Calabresi and Perl argue that “the right to a public school 
education was already by 1868 a fundamental state constitutional 
right of State citizenship and that segregation in public schools was 
therefore unconstitutional from 1868 on.”222 In fact, they contend, 
“Brown is only justifiable on originalist grounds—at least if one 
focuses on the right to a public school education as it stood in state 
constitutional law in 1868 and in 1954.”223  
Calabresi and Perl focus on the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
Privileges or Immunities Clause,224 a provision that “was only 
meant to protect fundamental civil rights that are deeply rooted in 
American history and tradition.”225 (In support of this position the 
authors cite, among other cases, Washington v. Glucksberg,226 one 
of the Court’s modern-era substantive due process decisions.) 
According to Calabresi and Perl, “any right that existed in 1868, 
the year the Fourteenth Amendment was passed, could fairly be 
                                                            
220 Steven G. Calabresi & Michael W. Perl, Originalism and Brown 
v. Board of Education (Aug. 8, 2013), Northwestern Public Law Research Paper 
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argued to be a fundamental right that is deeply rooted in American 
history and tradition” and “is therefore a ‘Privilege or Immunity’ 
of national and state citizenship.”227 Moreover, the authors contend 
that “any right protected by more than three-quarters of the states 
in 1868 in their state constitutions”—the number of states required 
to amend the United States Constitution228—”is a strong candidate 
to be a Fourteenth Amendment fundamental right.”229 
Calabresi and Perl employ the count-the-states analytic that the 
Supreme Court has used Eighth Amendment and Fourteenth 
Amendment cases230 and citing another recent substantive due 
process case (Lawrence v. Texas).231 they also look to state 
constitutional provisions circa 1868. By their count, in 1868 the 
constitutions of thirty of the thirty-seven states of the Union 
explicitly required state establishment of a public school system.232 
Three states—Kentucky, Tennessee, and Iowa—constitutionally 
required school funding but did not mandate public school 
systems. The constitutions of four states—Connecticut, Illinois, 
New Jersey, and Virginia—did not recognize the right to a free 
public education in 1868, according to the authors.233 
It is thus as clear as day that there was an Article V 
consensus of three quarters of the states in 1868 that 
recognized that children have a fundamental right to 
a free public education. A child’s right to a free 
public school education was clearly a privilege or 
immunity of state citizenship in 1868 as to which 
racial discrimination was forbidden by the 
Fourteenth Amendment. The outcome of Brown v. 
                                                            
227 Calabresi & Perl, supra note 220, at 13–14. 
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Board of Education was thus a correct outcome not 
only in 1954 but also in 1868.234  
Calabresi and Perl note Michael McConnell’s observation that 
at the time of the framing of the Fourteenth Amendment it was not 
likely that Congress would have proposed, and the states would 
have ratified, an amendment understood to outlaw the “deeply 
ingrained” practice of school segregation.235 Not contesting the 
accuracy of that observation, they state that their difference with 
McConnell  
is nothing less than the difference between 
formalism and realism. From a formalist 
perspective, the focus should be on the text of state 
constitutional provisions as they were formally 
written and in place in 1868. . . . Professor 
McConnell’s focus on the actual practice of the 
states in the 1860s reflects a kind of realism that 
disregards the law and the actual text of the state 
constitutions.236 
Calabresi and Perl’s analysis is problematic in several respects. 
First, they recognize that many if not most Americans living in 
1868 could have missed their complex legal argument.237 If most 
persons alive in 1868 did not know of or could not comprehend 
their analysis, one must question whether and how any operative 
original understanding or meaning did or could exist. 
Second, Calabresi and Perl’s reliance on the Court’s 
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substantive due process traditionalist jurisprudence imports a 
nonoriginalist methodology into a purportedly originalist 
analysis.238 Due process traditionalism239 interprets the 
Constitution “in accordance with the long-standing and evolving 
practices, experiences, and tradition of the nation.”240 
Traditionalism does not seek to discern a fixed and time-dated 
meaning of a constitutional provision and “differs from 
originalism, which draws its normative authority not from 
historical practice but from a social contract theory of 
precommitment by the American people.”241 For instance, in 
Washington v. Glucksberg, cited by the authors, the Court held that 
the asserted right to assistance in committing suicide was not a 
fundamental interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. The 
Court looked to 700 years of Anglo-American common law 
tradition punishing or disapproving of suicide and assisting 
suicide; the common law of the American colonies; the prohibition 
of suicide in colonial and early state legislatures and courts; the 
criminalization of assisted suicide in most states at the time of the 
1868 ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment; and states’ recent 
reexamination and reaffirmation of the assisted-suicide ban.242 The 
conclusion that the claimed right was not constitutionally protected 
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was reached following a traditional and historical—and not 
originalist—judicial inquiry.  
Was the right to a public school education a deeply rooted right 
and tradition in 1868? Calabresi and Perl answer that question in 
the affirmative. It is not apparent, however, that the fundamentality 
analysis supports their conclusion. The fact that public schools 
existed in many states in 1868 does not, standing alone, establish 
the requisite deeply rooted history and tradition. Were public 
schools a traditional or a new and developing aspect of state 
governance and practice in 1868? As Brown noted, “the movement 
toward free common schools, supported by general taxation, had 
not yet taken hold” at the time of the adoption of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.243 If this is correct, state-mandated public education 
was not deeply rooted and was therefore not a fundamental right as 
understood by Calabresi and Perl.  
Third, Calabresi and Perl’s count-the-state-constitutions 
analysis illustrates the importance of interpreter discretion in 
selecting the level of generality at which a claimed right is framed 
and characterized.244 Glucksberg instructed that “a careful 
description of the asserted fundamental interest” is required.245 
Calabresi and Perl tally the number of state constitutions requiring 
the establishment of a public school system as of 1868 and use that 
count as the basis for their conclusion that in 1868 children had a 
fundamental right to a free public education.  
Note that the authors framed the issue as one involving the 
general right to a free public education and not as the narrower and 
more carefully described right to attend desegregated public 
schools. Asking not what number of states had constitutions 
requiring public school education in 1868, but rather what number 
of states had racially segregated schools at, near, or after the time 
of the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, is the more 
careful description of the asserted fundamental right. An 1868 state 
constitutional mandate of a public school system does not negate 
the fact that at the time of the proposal and adoption of the 
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Fourteenth Amendment “the practice of school segregation was 
widespread in both Southern and Northern states, as well as the 
District of Columbia .”246 As previously noted, during the Brown 
oral argument, the Court was advised that at the time of the 
ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment 23 of the 30 ratifying 
states had or immediately installed separate schools for African-
American and white children.247 And Brown noted that “any 
education of Negroes was forbidden by law in some states.”248 
That state constitutions required a free public education does not 
mean that that education was available to all without regard to 
race.  
Fourth, and related to the previous point, Calabresi and Perl’s 
rejection of McConnell’s “focus on the actual practices of the 
states in the 1860s”249 ignores “the vast gap that can separate the 
law on the books from the law in life.”250 Constitutional text 
proclaiming a right does not mean that that right actually exists and 
is protected in the real world.251 Surely the actual and undeniable 
segregationist practices and policies of the 1860s are relevant and 
even critical evidence. Ignoring facts and evidence of the social 
meaning of racial segregation and subordination and the real-world 
and enervating effects of white supremacy is to construct a world 
bleached of the prejudices and beliefs existing before, at the time 
of, and in the years following Reconstruction. That formalist 
choice to give primacy of place to words on paper and not African 
Americans’ lived and racialized experiences is yet another 
exemplar of the unconstrained discretion that originalists enjoy. 
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Fifth, and finally, Calabresi and Perl argue for recognition of a 
fundamental right not considered and tested in the Constitution’s 
formal Article V amendment process. As previously noted, they 
argue that any right protected by the constitutions of more than 
three-fourths of the states in 1868 may be considered a 
fundamental right and privilege or immunity of state citizenship 
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment;252 that in 1868 thirty of 
the thirty-seven state constitutions required a public school 
education; and, accordingly, that there was an Article V consensus 
to such an education at the time of the adoption of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  This Article V consensus argument is a departure 
from the formalist view that “the only way We the People can 
speak is through the forms specified by Article V.”253 Bruce 
Ackerman has remarked that constitutional originalists’ exclusive 
focus on “the 1787 text and its amendments under Article V does 
not merely reinforce the formalist tendencies already apparent in 
modern case law; it represents nothing less than an elitist effort to 
erase the constitutional legacy left behind by our parents and 
grandparents as they fought and won the popular struggles of the 
twentieth century.”254 Calabresi and Perl’s non-formalist Article V 
consensus approach is offered in support of their position that the 
outcome in Brown was correct in 1868 and in 1954. Discretionary 
originalism and outcome-influential interpretive choices are key to 
their analysis and conclusions. 
 
6. John McGinnis and Michael Rappaport 
 
John McGinnis and Michael Rappaport, proponents of original 
methods originalism,255 find it striking that “originalists have not 
                                                            
252 See Calabresi & Perl, supra note 220, at 15. 
253 ACKERMAN, supra note 24, at 19. 
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255 “To find the original intent of the Constitution’s enactors, one 
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addressed the . . . critique . . . that the original meaning of a 
document built on exclusion cannot be a guide to constitutional 
interpretation in a society where that exclusion is almost 
universally condemned as unjust and is indeed rightly seen as the 
original sin of the United States.”256 The Constitution “was enacted 
when African Americans and women did not have the franchise 
and could not participate in the constitution-making process. Not 
surprisingly, a constitution so fabricated did not include provisions 
that reflected their interests—most notably, of course, a prohibition 
on slavery.”257 McGinnis and Rappaport believe that the exclusion 
of African Americans from the supermajoritarian constitutional 
enactment process “makes more pointed and general the difficulty 
for originalism created by the famous holding in Brown v. Board of 
Education that invalidated school segregation.”258 
McGinnis and Rappaport note that the Supreme Court “failed 
to enforce the civil rights guaranteed by the Constitution.”259 In 
their view, Plessy v. Ferguson’s failure to strike down Louisiana’s 
separate-but-equal law “represented a denial of the equality to 
contract and thus of a privilege or immunity guaranteed by the 
Fourteenth Amendment because African Americans were denied 
the same right to contract to sit in particular coaches as whites.”260 
Plessy’s reasoning allowed state and local governments “to extend 
this apartheid regime to a variety of important contractual 
services” and the Court’s “distortion of the Fourteenth Amendment 
thus became a legal foundation for Jim Crow.”261 In their view, the 
“root of the tragedy” of the “greatest political evil in the history of 
the US polity” is the failure of government (including the Court) 
“to enforce the original meaning of the corrections [to the 
Constitution] enacted through the amendment process.”262 “This 
perspective suggests that the emphasis on Brown v. Board of 
Education in discussions of civil rights jurisprudence has obscured 
                                                            
Constitution at the time it was enacted.” Id. at 118.  
256 Id. at 9–10. 
257 Id. at 9. 
258 Id.  
259 Id. at 110. 
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a salient truth about the history of civil rights and constitutional 
interpretation.”263 Notably absent from this account, as in other 
originalist discussions of Brown, is consideration of the question 
whether school segregation involves a social and not a civil 
right.264 If attending a desegregated school is a social right, those 
who fail to understand or who ignore the civil-social rights 
distinction make a categorical mistake and erroneously construe 
the Fourteenth Amendment to cover that which is beyond the 
scope of the amendment.265  
McGinnis and Rappaport then take up the question of whether 
Brown can be squared with originalism. Citing Michael 
McConnell’s “admittedly controversial thesis,” they attempt to 
reconcile originalism and Brown266 and conclude that Brown’s 
holding “can be defended on originalist grounds, even if the 
opinion’s reasoning was not originalist.”267 They argue further:  
[W]hether or not originalism is compatible with 
Brown, the world would likely have been so 
different, had the Reconstruction Amendments not 
been nullified for generations by the refusal of all 
the branches to follow the Constitution’s original 
meaning, that it is not even clear that Brown would 
have been necessary to secure educational equality 
for blacks. That is, the greater economic and voting 
power that would have come with a fair 
enforcement of the Reconstruction Amendments 
would likely have eroded the caste system of public 
education in the South.268  
This position—that Brown would have been unnecessary in a 
world in which the branches of government followed the original 
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meaning of the Reconstruction Amendments—introduces a 
significant complexity. The problem with this counterfactual 
approach, involving as it does a thought experiment and the 
conjectural consideration of an imagined world, “is that one’s 
counterfactual comparisons and conclusions will always remain 
highly debatable because, given the absence of a reality metric, no 
one can be right or wrong in a counterfactual world.”269 This 
counterfactual analysis is yet another example of discretionary 
originalism and the ways in which originalist interpreters are not 
meaningfully constrained in formulating and applying a (their) 
preferred originalist theory. And the view that the world may have 
been different and Brown would have been unnecessary had the 
original meaning of the Reconstruction Amendments been 
followed is certainly a debatable proposition. Those engaged in 
that debate have and can employ interpretive discretion as they 




It is understandable that some originalists are concerned that 
the conclusion that Brown was wrongly decided could discredit 
and delegitimize originalism. However, that understanding does 
not justify or excuse deviations from originalist dictates in the form 
of discretionary originalism. Some originalists “have gone to 
implausible lengths to square their accounts with Brown,” “reading 
aspirational clauses at low levels of generality” and arguing that 
the Equal Protection Clause’s “cryptic language must be read to 
condemn segregated schools, perhaps if we stare hard enough at 
the word ‘equal.’”270  
One can conclude that Brown was wrongly decided as an 
originalist matter271 without calling into question the validity of the 
methodology, for “the view that accounts of constitutional 
interpretation and judicial review should be tested against any 
                                                            
269 Gregory Mitchell, Case Studies, Counterfactuals, and Causal 
Explanations, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1517, 1550 (2004). 
270 VERMEULE, supra note 15, at 280. 
271 See supra Part III-A. 
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particular decision is seriously misguided.”272 As Lawrence Solum 
has observed, “[c]onstitutional theorists of all stripes must confront 
the possibility that their preferred method of constitutional 
interpretation will sanction horrendous evil. On those occasions, it 
is the law that must give way—not our theories of constitutional 
interpretation.”273 In his view, Brown was “right to adopt what 
amounts to an unlawful judicial amendment to the Constitution” if 
there were no originalist grounds justifying the decision and the 
Court determined that a unanimous decision “was the best or only 
means to end the evil of segregation . . .”274 Those with a 
“perfectionist faith”275 who claim or are engaged in the quest for 
originalist purity may not agree.  
An originalist interpreter has and is free to exercise interpretive 
discretion in deciding to employ an originalist and not a 
nonoriginalist methodology; in choosing from a menu of originalist 
theories; in framing the inquiry and selecting the level of generality 
at which the constitutional issue is defined; in selecting the 
pertinent time period for originalist evaluation; and in determining 
what facts and factors should be included in the decisional 
calculus. An interpreter free to make such choices with few or no 
interpretive constraints can construct and map any and all routes to 
a preferred destination, including one in which Brown can be 
squared with originalism and was not wrongly decided.  
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